

The Origins, Program, and Composition of Appian's *Roman History**

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Wie Gabba...sagt, geht es der wissenschaftlichen Forschung um die
genaue Bestimmung des Gewährsmanns oder der Quellenautoren,
die Appian vermutlich für sein Werk verarbeitete.

I. Introduction

The words are Matthias Gelzer's, and they form a classic expression of the way Appian was viewed until only a few decades ago.¹ With some notable exceptions, Appian's *Roman History* has been discounted as a poorly written work pieced together by an inept, if enthusiastic, amateur since Johann Schweighäuser gave us the first scholarly edition in 1785.² The most damning appraisals were those of the positivistic historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who attempted to reconstruct an objective history of the late Republic based in part upon the text of Appian and eagerly sought the *Gewährsmänner* behind these facts to assure themselves of the paternity of Appian's data. One tacit assumption of these critics was that Appian tried to

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¹Gelzer 286. On the history of scholarship on Appian, see Goldmann 2–5, McGing 496–99, Gowing 1992: 2–3 and *passim*, and Bucher 1997: 128 n. 1, 204–12. Throughout this paper I use “civil wars” to refer to the phenomenon in general, “Civil War” to refer to a specific war such as the Civil War of 49 B.C.E., and *Civil Wars* for the five-book subsection of Appian's history (= *BC*). All translations are my own except a few passages I have taken (as noted) from Carter's translation in order to avoid imposing my own interpretation. All ancient dates are C.E. unless otherwise noted.

²On Schweighäuser's positive view in reaction to previous negative views, Goldmann 3.

write political history in the tradition of a Thucydides or a Tacitus. In comparison with these great historians, Appian is deficient in historical analysis, and, where we can check it, Appian's text contains a perplexing mixture of good data and errors. An Appian who was a bumbling assembler of other authors' work into a political history seemed to explain the odd mix: good data came from other authors' pens, errors came from Appian's bungled attempts to cut and paste those authors' words together to form his own "history."³ Such a view eliminated the need to think carefully about any program arising from Appian or the motivations for it.

Interest in Appian has customarily been based upon the claim that, like him or not, he offers the best surviving connected narrative of the years covered by the *Civil Wars* (roughly 133–35 B.C.E.) and the sole connected narrative for the years covered in *BC* 1 (133–70).⁴ This is odd, because *BC* 1, the most important book under these criteria, manifests a very different character. Emilio Gabba, whose name is synonymous with study of the *Civil Wars*, saw *BC* 1 as composed of two poorly fused parts: 1) a framework due to Appian and 2) accounts of the various *staseis* taken without substantial alteration from sources (and thus animated by different interests), "a book that seems to be made up of separated pieces."⁵ Appian himself was of minor importance for Gabba, who held to the older view that Appian was a faithful copyist or excerptor and compiler.⁶ Gabba saw nothing but a few summaries, the occasional references to Appian's own time, and remarks clarifying Roman customs for a Greek audience as Appian's own contributions; the rest was raw material suitable to be mined for historical data.⁷ Cuff's sharply critical observation of "Appian's

³The zenith (or nadir) of the trend is the work of Kornemann (1921), arguing that similarities in wording between Appian's preface to the *BC* and the actual text of the *BC* show that he copied both from the same single source (presumably under the assumption that he could never have managed otherwise to use the same or similar words to describe the same events twice). Open contempt erupts in the work of Meyer 606–7 ("...seine alles Maß übersteigende Unwissenheit, die ihn mitunter zu den naivsten Kombinationen veranlaßt") and Cuff 1967, 1983.

⁴See, e.g., Gabba 1967: xxi; Bowie 1985: I.707; Swain 1996: 248–49.

⁵Gabba 1956: 8, 109: "Il libro I è, dunque, composto da narrazioni parziali, tante quante sono le sedizioni comprese nel periodo storico coperto dal libro stesso, e disposte l'una dopo l'altra secondo l'ordine cronologico."

⁶Copyist, excerptor, and compiler: Gabba 1967: xvii, "...Appiano vale per le fonti che usa."

⁷Appian's references to his own time: vanderLeest 1989 (*passim*). Gabba 1956: 219 n. 1 and Goldmann 85–104, 114–15 also provide lists of Appian's own contributions (not restricted to temporal references, and the latter with discussion).

ability to extract a significant item, and...his inability to make proper use of it" highlights the gap between what Appian produced and the "properly" used material modern historians expect, or would like, to find.⁸

This mode of thought has rightly been challenged in recent years, but the habit of looking at Appian through an exclusively historical lens is firmly rooted and only slowly yielding. Part of the problem lies in the enormous prestige of Gabba's work, which has framed the debate over Appian for nearly half a century, just as Schwartz's 1896 *RE* article did for the half-century before that. It is instructive to consider how tentatively and deferentially Magnino makes an almost minimalist case that Appian was not a mindless copyist in his extremely important 1993 treatment of the *Civil Wars*, and to observe that his 1998 commentary on *BC* 4 is still animated by the same historical interests as Gabba's commentary on *BC* 1, despite a gap of thirty-nine years and Magnino's own fundamental contributions, which have altered the debate over Appian's source use and method of composition.⁹ This approach to the author stands out all the more because already in 1988 Goldmann had proved that there are indisputably original strains that run through the whole work and pervade it, and must on any analysis (except the untenable one that Appian copied everything from one and only one universal history) be Appian's own.¹⁰

The appearance of Gowing's *Triumviral Narratives* (1992) and the many articles in the 1993 *ANRW* II 34.1 were watershed moments in Appian studies,¹¹ but the analysis of Appian's method of composition and his program behind the whole and parts of the *Roman History* is far from complete. Though we now know much more about the structure of individual books of the *Roman History*, Appian's patterns of speech and habits of mind, and the amount of original thought he put into his work than we did a decade ago,¹² we need to continue

⁸Cuff 1983: 157.

⁹On Gabba's interests, see 1970: vii; Magnino 1983 is also of great importance. Magnino's (1993: especially 546) deference to Gabba is clearest in his refusal to reanalyze *BC* 1. Gowing 1992: 3 also sees the constraints imposed by Gabba's work.

¹⁰Steidle (404) shows why the single source theory cannot stand.

¹¹Other important work: Luce 1958, 1961, 1964; Cuff 1967, 1983; Steidle; Goldmann; vanderLeest 1988; Brodersen 1988, 1990; Gowing 1990; Gargola. Some attempt at synthesis can be found in Hose and Carter. Swain 1996 gives a regrettably brief discussion of Appian (248–53), but usefully depicts the cultural background.

¹²See, e.g., Gowing's important article (1990; results extended in 1992: 239–45) on the speech of Cassius before Philippi. He shows that Appian used Cassius' battle exhortation to summarize events and issues leading directly up to Philippi (from the final chapters of *BC* 2 to the end of *BC* 4), a conclusion important not only because it finally

rethinking our view of Appian as an author and the purpose of his work. His interest to us as a reflection of contemporary Roman society makes his text very valuable, even if discoveries about his working method and programmatic interests complicate the task of interpreting the historical data in it.

The debate over Appian needs to be reframed. He was not a “historian” in the sense that a Thucydides or a Tacitus are generally considered to be, and his work, *sensu stricto*, should not be treated as a history in their tradition,¹³ though the lack of a category into which to put the *Roman History* makes the adoption of the misleading term understandable, both by the author himself (*Pr.* 1.1) in antiquity and by moderns.¹⁴ One purpose of this paper is to spur discussion and reevaluation of both what Appian wanted to accomplish with the *Roman History* and what that work really was.

I begin with a formal demonstration that Appian composed the books of the *Roman History* in predominantly serial order. Serial composition is neither obvious nor inevitable, and with such a formal demonstration in hand, we can with some assurance trace the evolution of Appian’s thought in composing the *Roman History* (such a demonstration also offers the bonus of many new insights into his method of composition). Then, after analyzing Appian’s

proves that Appian does (at least sometimes) compose his own speeches, but also because it furnishes an extended example of Appian’s conscious, intelligent intervention in his work. Likewise, I was able to show (1997: 177–87) that Caesar’s prebattle exhortation at Pharsalus similarly summarizes the history and issues of that campaign (the central focus of *BC* 2). Cumulatively, these demonstrations have a further importance, in that we see Appian choosing systematically to study and write about discrete, thematically connected portions of the history he had to cover that do not necessarily coincide with his own book-divisions. This not only implies that he does not just follow one universal source, but also suggests strongly that he used sources of limited scope that focused closely (perhaps solely) upon the period in question. I further attempted to show that Caesar’s specialized account in *BC* 3 was among the sources behind the Pharsalus campaign (1997: 226–34).

¹³On the other hand, if, with Badian (1993: 125–62) and Boissier (1903: 180–81), we acknowledge that even these authors could stray from modern ideals of political history quite widely (Badian even argues for advocacy in Thucydides’ account of the Pentecontaetia), then Appian does stand in their tradition in that broader sense.

¹⁴*Pr.* 1.1: τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν ἱστορίαν ἀρχόμενος συγγράφειν. Usually he uses less precise phrases or periphrases: *Pr.* 14.53 (Ῥωμαϊκῶν < Ῥωμαϊκά); *Pr.* 15.61 (περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς αὐτῶν συγγράφοντα); *BC* 1.6.25 (συγγραφεὶς > συγγραφή, the most common term used for the history or individual books in it: cf. *BC* 1.34.151); *BC* 2.1.1, *BC* 5.1.2 (ἐμφύλια and variants). For the sake of clarity I retain the customary renderings of “*Roman History*,” etc.

program and the evidence for it (with unexpected side results), I will use the programmatic remarks and other evidence from the *Roman History* to uncover Appian's personal stake in his history and his motive for writing. The picture that emerges is in some ways surprising when Appian is compared to his contemporaries. It suggests his similarity to some of them in unexpected ways and contrasts with some scholarly interpretations of Appian, offering additional evidence in the interesting debate over the ideas and positions of the Greek provincial intellectuals *vis à vis* the Roman Empire of the "second sophistic."

Before starting, I must declare a few of my basic assumptions. I take Appian's prefaces to be his own straightforward descriptions of what he wanted to accomplish with the *Roman History*, and I take most of the large-scale organization of the work to be Appian's (much of the microstructure, as well, though that will not detain us here). Everything in Appian's narrative that he did not witness himself clearly came from sources. However, I follow the work of Brodersen, Magnino, and others, which argues that Appian used multiple categories of sources: general knowledge (from his education or a lifetime of general reading); memory and notes (from reading in preparation for composition, probably facilitated by slave assistants); and direct source use (from multiple sources). Any statement in the *Roman History* that is not subject to source control is a potentially indissoluble mixture taken from these three categories of sources; deliberate or accidental distortion thanks to his interests and method is also probable.¹⁵

II. Towards a Relative Chronology of Composition

The few dates that can be discerned for the composition of the *Roman History* follow. The *terminus post quem* is the date of Fronto's letter to Antoninus Pius recommending Appian for a procuratorship (*ad Pium* 10). Appian mentions the procuratorship in his *Preface*, which must postdate the letter, which Champlin rightly places in "the 140s."¹⁶ In addition, the *Preface* states (9.34) that the Empire had lasted 900 years, which would therefore date it to after 148/149.¹⁷ The *Preface* (6.22–24) also tells us that very nearly two hundred years had passed since the beginning of Caesar's *monarchia*, which puts us in or a little

¹⁵For a synthetic discussion see Gowing 1992: 39–50 (though disagreements will be noted below); for a less broadly based discussion focusing more on details, see Bucher 1997: 53–135, 204–49.

¹⁶Champlin 1974: 149; Van den Hout (294) places the date in 158–60.

¹⁷See Schwartz 1896: 216; Reuß 464–65; Luce 1958: 8; Gabba 1967: x ("verso il 150 d.C."); Brodersen 1993: 353.

before the years 152–56.¹⁸ A *terminus ante quem* for BC 1 of 166/167 is the only other date about which we can be relatively sure, and the few other chronological indications we can gather add no precision to these *termini*, which are in themselves not very helpful in working out a chronology of composition.¹⁹ Appian might have composed over many years between about 150 and 167 and even beyond; or he might have composed the work from start to finish in 150 (to propose two arbitrary scenarios consistent with the *termini*). Nor do these dates, their imprecision aside, tell us anything about the order in which the books of the *Roman History* were composed.

Though the overall order of composition is not obvious, even as early as the introduction to the text of Mendelssohn it was observed that the nature of the discrepancy between the prospectus in the *Preface* and the actual state of the *Roman History* showed that the composition of the *Preface* antedated the completion of the work as a whole.²⁰ No comprehensive investigation of the

¹⁸This rough calculation takes the beginning of Caesar's monarchy to be in the years 48–44 B.C.E.; two hundred years puts us in 152–56; *not quite* 200 years puts us in the early 150s, or even the late 140s. In taking the Gaius Caesar at *Pr.* 6.22 to refer to the dictator, I follow Gabba 1967: x and vanderLeest 1988: 48 (arguing plausibly for Caesar's second dictatorship as the object of the chronological reference). Bowie (1985: 889) suggests that Octavian could be meant under his adoptive name. When Appian refers to Octavian as Gaius Caesar and some ambiguity could result (as at *Pr.* 14.59), he adds τὸν Σεβαστὸν ἐπικλην, *vel sim.* Still, the Gaius Caesar at *Pr.* 6.22 who (*inter alia*) preserved the form and name of the Republic but made himself sole ruler over all (τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφύλαξεν, μόναρχον δ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπέστησε πᾶσι), and who began the sole rule still in existence in Appian's day (6.23: καὶ ἔστιν ἡδὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ μέχρι νῦν ὑφ' ἐνὶ ἄρχοντι, κτλ.) looks more like Augustus than the dictator. In the end, I have followed his consistent onomastic practice for Octavian (the gloss at *Pr.* 14.59 shows he knew to make the distinction as early as the *Preface*), but with some misgiving, because Appian does occasionally mistake dates and names even when he seems to know about his material in other respects (for some detailed examples with possible explanations arising from Appian's method, see my 1995 article). For a much more skeptical view of the dates, see Carter ix.

¹⁹Appian mentions the Hadrianic practice (suspended under Pius) of sending out consulars to "govern the divisions of Italy" (*BC* 1.38.172), a practice subsequently readopted (with changes) under M. Aurelius in 166/167. To refer to the practice as Hadrianic, Appian would have to have written this passage at the latest in 166: see Rosenberg in *RE* 10 (1917) 1147–48, with the caveat that a superseded date for the reinstitution of the practice of 163/164 is given there (corrected by vanderLeest 1988: 58 n. 18). On the dates generally, see Gabba 1967: x–xi.

²⁰Mendelssohn 1879: v, n. 1, followed by Viereck-Roos-Gabba (1962 [= 1939]: vi). Cf. Gowing 1992: 44: "We cannot know whether he both researched *and* composed his

compositional order of the books of the *Roman History* as an end in itself has ever been published,²¹ and the lack of one has led to irregularities in the dating of the work. One is badly needed to act as a starting point for further analysis, and indeed, to bring the whole problem of the chronology of Appian's composition sharply into focus. Confusion because of the lack of focus on the problem is easy to find, even in recent scholarship. Scholars have repeatedly treated chronological references occurring anywhere within the *Roman History* as valid for assigning a date to the whole;²² even when they have taken composition to be serial, they have not done so on the basis of a formal demonstration. Such a demonstration is particularly necessary after Pelling's

History seriatim, beginning with the *Reges* and working through successive sections in turn, saving the *Bella Civilia* until last. This is of course possible, but on the face of it seems improbable." Gowing's second question, concerning serial research, may be answered in part on the basis of the results we will obtain. Appian's growing knowledge of how his history will be arranged is a sufficient demonstration of ongoing research. Appian's increased understanding of the historical problems between (e.g.) the *Preface* and the preface to *BC* 1 betrays additional research between composition of the two passages.

²¹The best attempt to date is in the unpublished dissertation of vanderLee st (1988).

²²Hose (157 n. 12), following Mendelssohn (1879: v, n. 1), is correct to observe "daß das Proöm vor Abschluß des Gesamswerkes verfaßt worden sein muß, eine Beobachtung, die für die Datierung des Werkes [and its parts!] nicht ohne Relevanz ist, da deshalb die aus dem Proöm eruierbaren termini für ein Datierung nicht für das Gesamtwerk herangezogen werden dürfen." A few examples to show that the problem posed by the lack of a formal treatment is serious and has caused problems even in good recent scholarship: Luce (1958: 8) rightly argued that the reference to *iuridici* in *BC* 1.38.172 gives a *terminus ante quem* for the *Preface* of 166/167; he further argued (1958: 12) that the mention of various books in the *Preface* meant that they had already been written by the time of the composition of the *Preface*. Taken together, they imply that the *Preface* can be dated by the books mentioned in a prospectus it contains. Gabba (1967: x) implicitly asserts that the *Preface* can date the entire work, echoed by Brodersen (1988: 461), who argues that the extension of the boundary of the Empire beyond the Euphrates in the Parthian War of Verus and Marcus (165/166) means that the "Werk" of Appian predates that year based upon the reference to the Euphrates as a boundary of the Empire at *Preface* 1.4 (Reuß 464 points out the fallacy); vanderLeest (1989: 132) states that a reference to Appian's own time in the *Preface* (6.23) "helps to establish a *terminus ante quem* for Appian's work," which it surely cannot do except for the *Preface*. Brodersen 1993: 353–54 is more careful, adding that the mention of Seleucia on the Tigris (destroyed in Verus' and Marcus' war) at *Syr.* 57.296 must also predate 165/166 (this is still problematic, for it presupposes that Appian could, wished to, and did keep abreast of current events with precision).

brilliant articles on Plutarch's composition of the later Roman *Lives*, which showed, *inter alia*, that Plutarch simultaneously prepared thematically similar *Lives*.²³

The *Preface* to the entire work, the preface to the *Civil Wars*, the internal cross references, and similar connections scattered throughout the work offer the best data for working out a relative chronology of composition, which can help us to flesh out the two imprecise *termini* we saw above: the *Preface* was composed between 148 and 156, and *BC 1* was probably composed before 166.

Appian changed the prospective order and arrangement of the books making up the *Roman History* during composition, and he occasionally apologizes for these modifications. Furthermore, since Appian did not remove the traces of these ongoing reconfigurations from his work, we see obvious discrepancies between the prospectuses put forward in the prefaces and the structure of the work as it now stands. Two points of method permit reconstruction of a chronology of composition. The first is the (not very risky) assumption that Appian proceeded to a more precise and carefully worked-out idea of his work's ultimate content and structure over time as he learned more from research and discovered hitherto unrecognized problems in composition and adjusted his work to solve the problems and make it more satisfactory to himself. The second is that increasing historical knowledge shows further research and hence a later time of composition.²⁴

II.i. Composition: The Evidence of the *Preface*

In the *Preface* (14.53–57), Appian gives a prospective list of the books that will make up the *Roman History*: a *Regal*, an *Italian*, a *Samnite*, a *Gallic*, a *Sicilian*, and a *Spanish History*, the *Hannibalic War*, a *Carthaginian* and a *Macedonian History*, “and so forth” (καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὁμοίως).²⁵ The list is incomplete, but because it is preliminary, not simply because of abbreviation. It seems to me an inescapable conclusion from the “and so forth” with which the list of ethnically arranged books ends that Appian knew that in all probability he would need more books in the series to complete his task.²⁶ On the other hand, since the

²³Pelling's work (1979, 1980) is fundamental to understanding composition in both Plutarch and Appian. On simultaneous preparation, see 1979: 75–83 and his subsequent response to criticism in 1995: 312–18. Gowing (1992: 39) also sees the applicability of Pelling's results to Appian's work.

²⁴Pelling 1979: 75–80 develops these criteria.

²⁵The list, distilled for brevity: (1) Βασιλική, (2) Ἰταλική, (3) Σαυνιτική, (4) Κελτική, (5) Σικελική, (6) Ἰβηρική, (7) Ἀννιβαϊκή, (8) Καρχηδονιακή, (9) Μακεδονική, (10) καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὁμοίως.

²⁶So too, Gabba 1967: xii.

“and so forth” occupies the place where only three more books would ultimately be added, and given his pedantic completeness elsewhere, especially in the *Preface*,²⁷ a hesitation to add only three more titles, had he known them, seems improbable. In fact, we witness his late realization that he needs yet another ethnic book, the *Illyrian History*, in the final words of *BC* 5. When he wrote the *Preface*, he had already carried out a certain amount of initial reading and research that made him want to divide the history of Roman expansion by theater of action. He had probably not composed any of these books yet, and in the event, he would need another fourteen of them (some would be appended to earlier books).²⁸ More information can be wrung from his prospectus, however: he briefly describes the contents of the first three books and groups them under a general rubric (τὰς μὲν τρεῖς ἡγητέον εἶναι Ῥωμαϊκῶν Ἰταλικᾶς, 14.53), as though he had done at least a bit of more specialized research on them, but leaves the six following as bare titles in prospect. His knowledge thus diminishes in a pattern we can trace: three titles with descriptions, six bare titles, and three omitted titles that will eventually be recognized as needed and added in the same sequence of ethnic books.²⁹

²⁷Cf. *Pr.* 1.1–5.18, three Teubner pages giving the boundaries of the Empire in exhaustive detail; *Pr.* 12.46–48, a lengthy (even tedious) description of how he was forced to wade through chronologically-ordered texts when he sought to follow the history of only one geographical area; *BC* 1.71.329–73.340, three Teubner pages on those slain by Marius; *BC* 4.12.45–53.255, forty Teubner pages detailing the Triumviral proscriptions, etc.

²⁸To the best of our ability to tell, he appended (1) a *Numidian History* to the *Carthaginian History* (the two appeared together in Photius' list of books as the *Libyan History*); (2) an *Illyrian History* to the *Macedonian History*; (3) a *Hellenic History* with (4) an *Ionian History* followed the *Macedonian History*; (5) a *Syrian History* (extant) followed the *Hellenic* and *Ionian Histories*; (6) the extant *Mithridatic Wars* (like the *Hannibalic War*, it is an ethnic book, even though the title refers to the chief antagonist) follows the *Syrian History*; (7–10) the *Egyptian History* (in four books) followed the *Civil Wars*; (11) *Dacian*, (12) *Jewish*, (13) *Pontic*, and (14) *Arabian Histories* followed the *Egyptian History*. I omit the problematic *Parthian History* (see below) because I think it was never composed. For the titles and order of all of these books see Brodersen 1993: 342–43; Hose 154–55.

²⁹For this reason I must reject Hose's idea (157) that the *Preface* was composed to accompany a publication of only those books that are explicitly mentioned in the list: the list is not clear-cut, but shows Appian's vision of his project growing dimmer the further ahead he looks from a point at the very beginning. To the argument that Appian deliberately gave a limited list once he had determined upon a definite number of books to accompany the *Preface* in a published redaction, I would reply that Appian's habit was to leave prefatory remarks untouched, as we can also see in the discrepancy between

The curtailed list of ethnic books is followed by a summary description of other books to treat the civil wars (*Pr.* 14.59). No prospective book divisions are offered for the *Civil Wars*, though Appian gives the chief topics he wants to cover, divided up militarily according to the generals who fought them (ἐς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν στάσεων): Marius and Sulla, Pompey and Caesar, and later Antony and Octavian, first as they warred against the assassins, finally against one another. In such a prospectus we have a stage of planning somewhere between recognition of a need to break up material in a certain way and the actual determination upon book divisions or titles, a stage even more indeterminate than that for the last six ethnic books Appian had mentioned. If we take the three omitted ethnic books not to have been conceived in Appian's mind yet, the vaguely planned books of the *Civil Wars* fit naturally into the list in terms of decreasing knowledge of their titles, contents, and divisions. After mentioning the war between Antony and Octavian, the rudimentary prospectus of the *Civil Wars* concludes: "at which endpoint of the civil wars Egypt came under Roman rule and the Roman state turned into a monarchy." Appian thus planned to end the *Civil Wars* with the Roman conquest of Egypt and the beginning of Octavian's sole rule, and there is not even a hint of the *Egyptian History* he would ultimately write. The first notice of it in the extant portions of the *Roman History* appears only at *Mithridatic Wars* 114.557 (cf. *BC* 1.6.24–25, 2.90.379, and inferentially at 5.1.2).³⁰

II.ii. Composition: The Evidence of the Preface to the *Civil Wars* (*BC* 1.1–6)

As far as the *Civil Wars* are concerned, we saw in the *Preface* (14.59) that Appian focuses upon actual outbreaks of violence in the form of wars, expecting to use the generals who fought one another (στρατηγούς) as rubrics under which to gather material. In the preface to the *Civil Wars*, however, Appian demonstrates an improved understanding of the period by recognizing that the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, not the Civil War of Marius and Sulla, marks the beginning of the epoch of the *Civil Wars* (*BC* 1.6.25), and he also more plausibly speaks of δυναστεῖαι and designates the Gracchi and other factional

the preface to the *Civil Wars* and its final state. Furthermore, I think Hose sees more precision in Appian's original plan at the time of the composition of the *Preface* than really existed: he writes that Appian's plan was *erweitert* (and not simply *modifiziert*) by the addition of the unmentioned books to his hypothetical earlier edition of the mentioned books (but the *Preface* also mentions the *Civil Wars*, which Hose would not appear to consider a part of the earlier edition).

³⁰See Gabba 1967: 9–10. Gabba rightly identified the chronology of the changes in Appian's work with respect to the *Preface*, though, contrary to the view espoused here, he attributed the original scheme to a model (i.e., a source). See also Luce 1964: 259–60.

leaders as στασίαρχοι μοναρχικοί (*BC* 1.2.7). This flexible formulation, which Syme called “a suitable term,” corresponds better (if still imperfectly) to the reality and reflects a better understanding of the period of the *Civil Wars*.³¹ The second book was then to carry the story down to the death of Julius Caesar, “and the remaining books of the *Civil Wars*,” as Appian puts it (at this point meaning little more than “the rest of the material I intend to cover in the *Civil Wars*”) are to show what the Triumvirs did to one another and the Romans until the battle of Actium, the final and greatest event of the civil wars, was fought by Caesar (Octavian) against Antony and Cleopatra.³² Actium, or its immediate sequel, is to form the beginning of the *Egyptian History*: from the wording, it is hard to tell whether Appian intends the sea battle to be the culminating act of the *Civil Wars* or the beginning of the *Egyptian History*.³³ At the very least, the wording seems to indicate that Appian intended the *BC* to take events rather close to Actium even if that battle was to be put in the *EH* (ὅσα...ἔδρασαν, μέχρι τὸ τελευταῖον...ἔργον, τὸ περὶ ᾠΑκτιον). My own opinion is that when Appian wrote the preface he was still debating the proper place for the battle of Actium in his mind, and the ambiguity of his language reflects his indecision.

At any rate, by the time of the composition of the preface to the *Civil Wars*, Appian has sketched out the contents of the first two books in a prospective form, which does generally correspond to that of those books as we have them. We can also see that by now the relative importance of the *Civil Wars* and the *Egyptian History* has changed; the latter, marking the change to monarchy at Rome (and focusing on Appian's homeland), has now emerged as more important, with the *BC* forming only a necessary prologue, “because it was

³¹Syme 1988: 2.

³²*BC* 1.6.25: αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐμφυλίων βίβλοι δεικνύουσιν, ὅσα οἱ τρεῖς ἐς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ Ῥωμαίους ἔδρασαν, μέχρι τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τῶν στάσεων καὶ μέγιστον ἔργον, τὸ περὶ ᾠΑκτιον Καίσαρι πρὸς ᾠΑντώνιον ὁμοῦ καὶ Κλεοπάτραν γενόμενον, ἀρχὴ καὶ τῆς Αἰγυπτιακῆς συγγραφῆς ἔσται.

³³Gabba 1967 (= 1958) 9–10 already noted difficulties in interpreting Appian's prospective *termini*. Luce 1964: 260 translates *BC* 1.6.25, “The remaining books of the *Civil Wars* [i.e., 3–5] relate what the triumvirs did to one another and to the Roman people up to the final and most momentous action of the civil strife, the one which took place at Actium with Caesar opposing both Antony and Cleopatra,—which will be the point of departure [arkhe] of my *Egyptian History*,” which neatly brings out the ambiguity. Combes-Dounous-Voisin-Torrens (33 n. 20) take Actium to have been in the *EH*, though perhaps from the faulty reasoning that the *BC* as we have it concludes in 35 B.C.E. White (13) and Carter (4) retain the ambiguity but may be read as understanding Actium to have been destined for the *EH*.

necessary for me to write it in order to lead up to my Egyptian narrative, ending where that begins. For it was because of this civil war that Egypt was captured, Cleopatra being Antonius' ally" (*BC* 1.6.24).³⁴

The preface to the *Civil Wars* is thus better informed historically than the *Preface*, and the division of the material, though still at odds with the extant scheme of the *Civil Wars*, is more carefully worked out than the divisions proposed in the *Preface*. The two phenomena are related and must be traced to intervening research, and the latter also to experience gained through the extended task of composition. Both results demonstrate persuasively that the preface to the *Civil Wars* postdates the *Preface*, and the amount of research implied by the new information and arrangement suggests that the preface to the *Civil Wars* was probably composed substantially after the *Preface*.

Nothing in the preface to the *Civil Wars* indicates that Appian knew how many books (beyond a second) he would require to reach the prospective end at or near Actium in 31 B.C.E. Just as in the *Preface*, the omission is due to uncertainty, not taciturnity, as is shown in this case by Appian's last-minute adjustments to the three additional books he did compose and the unexpected termination of the *Civil Wars* in 35 B.C.E. rather than in 31.

II.iii. Composition: The Evidence of the Internal Cross-References

The internal cross-references support the idea of a serial sequence of composition, but only generally, because there are at least three instances where they are contradictory.³⁵ For example, a reference in the *Spanish History* (14.56) treats the *Hannibalic War* as already written, referring to material "the following book demonstrates, which encompasses all of the actions of Hannibal in Italy, and from this is called 'Hannibalic'," whereas, in the beginning of the

³⁴ὅτι μοι τῆς Αἰγυπτίας συγγραφῆς τάδε προηγούμενα καὶ τελευτήσοντα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀναγκαῖον ἦν προαναγράψασθαι· ὥδε γὰρ Αἴγυπτος ἐλήφθη, διὰ τήνδε τὴν στάσιν, Ἀντωνίου Κλεοπάτρας συμμαχούσης. The translation is Carter's (4). Luce (1964: 259–62) rightly pointed out the importance and function of the *Egyptian History*, recognizing (261) that it forms the climax of the *Roman History*. Luce also highlighted the fact that Appian had changed his mind about the division of material between the *Civil Wars* and the *Egyptian History*. See also Gabba 1967: xv–xvi, 10; Brodersen 1993: 354. On Appian's obvious personal involvement with Egyptian history—from Alexander's time, that is—see Enßlin 463 n. 2; Gabba 1956: 110 n. 5; Luce 1964: 261; Hose 167–73.

³⁵See Brodersen 1990: 50. vanderLeest (1988: 228–29) tabulates all of the cross-references, and values them greatly for lack of other information suggesting the order of composition (59). Pelling (1979: 80–82) found contradictory internal references in Plutarch's *Roman Lives*, as well.

Hannibalic War (1.2), we read of material which “has been shown in the *Spanish History*.”³⁶ Both *Mithridatic Wars* 22.85 (“as has been mentioned in the *Civil Wars*”) and 64.264 (“the events concerning Sulla have been written up in the *Civil Wars*”) look back to *BC* 1, while *BC* 1.55.241 (“as I said in the book before this one”) looks back to the *Mithridatic Wars*.³⁷ In addition, Appian does not uniformly adopt either a past or present tense in referring to other books in the history (cf. *BC* 2.18.67, ἡ Παρθικὴ δηλώσει γράφη . This use of the future tense to refer to a prospective book means that we cannot explain away the apparent discrepancy of two books, each looking back to the other, by assuming that Appian consistently uses a past or present tense in internal references, assuming the completed state of the work from the viewpoint of some future reader (like an “epistolary tense”). The *Illyrian History* provides an important diagnostic passage in which Appian refers to material in books almost certainly yet to be written in the past tense (εἴρηται: discussion at n. 41 below), but within the same sentence asserts that he *will* write more there about the present topic (ἐνθα...ἐρῶ πλέονα). It is possible that Appian has simply been careless here, but it is also possible that he is following an idiosyncratic convention for reference that has yet to be understood.

In the preface to the *Civil Wars* (1.6.24), Appian refers to the books of the *Civil Wars* as already written (“I wrote how these things came to pass and assembled them into a narrative”), and yet he had not even then fully worked out

³⁶So too, Gowing 1992: 44 n. 20. vanderLeest (1988: 66), who finds that the cross-references otherwise “seem to confirm that the books were produced in the order in which they would have appeared in the complete history: future references cite later books, past references cite earlier books,” offers a solution to this problem. He thinks that here Appian was engaged in simultaneous preparation, and that he could therefore “truthfully” cite from each book toward the other in the past tense (the same reasoning for Plutarch, Pelling 1979: 81–82). This is a good explanation (simultaneous preparation in the case of adjoining books with closely related themes is not surprising), and his suggestion (60) of some simultaneous preparation for the *Mithridatic Wars* and *BC* 1 also sounds reasonable (see the next note).

³⁷Though the possibility of simultaneous preparation has been raised to explain these references, it is not strictly necessary. From the time of the *Preface* Appian had known he would treat Sulla in the first portion of the *Civil Wars*. In preparing the *Mithridatic Wars*, Appian naturally read about Sulla, a main character in the wars. Since the two passages in the *Mithridatic Wars* look forward to points in Sulla's career as στρατάρχης, Appian could reasonably truthfully treat them as written, since he had already in essence done the work of preparation. Note, however, that neither reference specifies the book of the *BC*. Had the *BC* already been written, or had there been simultaneous preparation *sensu stricto*, it would have been easy to do so.

the division of the books of the *BC*, as we saw above (*BC* 1.34.151 offers an analogous problem). The divisions of *BC* 3–5 were not planned far in advance, but were apparently responses to *ad hoc* dynamic reconfigurations of the plan of the *Civil Wars* in Appian’s mind as he progressed. Only in the last sentence of *BC* 2 (154.649) do we get a formal (if vague) prospectus of *BC* 3–4: “how they [*sc.* the assassins] paid the penalty, the following books show.” By the time he wrote the first paragraph of *BC* 3 (1.1), Appian has decided on two books: “this and the following book will show how the most famous [*sc.* of Caesar’s assassins] paid the penalty.” At the beginning of *BC* 4 (1.1), Appian now makes explicit what the ending of *BC* 3 established tacitly: *BC* 3 got as far as the destruction of Cassius (Parmensis) and Trebonius, whereas “this fourth book of the *Civil Wars* shows” how Brutus and Cassius (Longinus), the prime movers of the conspiracy against Caesar, paid the penalty for their actions. At the end of *BC* 4 (135.568), Appian consciously brings this section of the *Civil Wars* to a decisive close, echoing his language from the previous three references: “Indeed, Cassius and Brutus had paid such a penalty.”³⁸

By the time he wrote *BC* 5.1.2, Appian has decided to cut off the *BC* earlier than advertised in the preface to *BC* 1. Now desiring to reserve *res Aegyptiae* for the *Egyptian History*, he is apologetic about the chronological necessity of including some Egyptian material in *BC* 5 and allowing material that belongs thematically in the *Egyptian History* to overflow into the *BC*:

After the death of Cassius and Brutus...Antony went to Asia, where Cleopatra the Queen of Egypt met him and conquered him as soon as he laid eyes upon her.... For which reason there is some Egyptian material in this book—just a little and not enough to merit appearing under its own title—wherefore it is mixed in with the *Civil Wars*, which predominate.

³⁸Gowing (1992: 38) writes that Appian clearly intended *BC* 3–5 to form a complete unit, citing the *Preface* (14.59) and the preface to *BC* 1 (1.6.25). This seems highly unlikely since the “unit” changed from *Preface* to preface of *BC* 1 to the actuality. In addition, the “unit” was evidently initially to contain the showdown between Octavian and Antony as well. *BC* 5 is literally a scrap of intervening material, partly Egyptian, partly civil wars, following the destruction of the assassins (cf. Luce 1964: 260). Another piece of evidence points to *BC* 5 being conceptually different from *BC* 3–4. Gowing’s (1990) own discovery that Cassius’ speech before Philippi, coming near the end of the account of the assassins (179 pages precede it, 35 follow), summarizes the history of *BC* 3–4, with close textual echoes lacking before and afterwards, shows that *BC* 3–4, not *BC* 3–5, were the unit. See also the next note.

We can see Appian's mind at work as he decides where the division should be and weighs the arguments; and if he only revamps his prospective endpoint of the *BC* at this late stage, he is clearly working through his history serially, "on the run," as it were.³⁹

We may ask why Appian only realizes that the *Civil Wars* should end in its fifth book at the late moment of preparing that very book. Appian was capable of digesting and foreseeing the division of at least two books' worth of material before writing (in the preface he knows the general contents of *BC* 1 and 2, and he knew the general contents of *BC* 3–4 at the end of *BC* 2). It seems probable that Appian only discovered that the nature of the post-Philippi material was such as to warrant breaking off the *Civil Wars* in 35 B.C.E. after the composition of *BC* 4. One reason for this could be that he had obtained a new source in preparation for post-Philippi material that opened his eyes to the changing focus of events (from Roman *staseis* to a foreign war with Egypt).

At the end of *BC* 5 (145.602), we once again see the process of thinking through the history "on the run" strikingly illustrated in the debate over the placement of the *Illyrian History*:

Octavian proceeded against the Illyrians.... I have no detailed knowledge of the Illyrian wars, and as their length does not justify separate treatment and there is nowhere else to relate them, I have thought it best to insert their history, down to the time when the capture of Illyria brought them to completion, in an earlier book and append them to that of neighboring Macedonia.⁴⁰

Appian has just realized that he needs to write another ethnic book, this one focusing on the Illyrians. That he decides to place this book back in the ethnic section preceding the *Civil Wars* is a useful datum, and should make us ask why the similarly ethnic *Egyptian History* follows the *Civil Wars*. One answer stems from the introductory passage of *BC* 5: the *Egyptian History* picks up where the mix of civil war/Egyptian material becomes predominantly Egyptian and

³⁹See vanderLeest 1988: 62. Luce (1964: 259–60) viewed Appian as having planned five books of the *Civil Wars* from an early point, assuming a level of forethought for which there is much counterevidence. Appian never gives a number to a future book of the *Civil Wars*; at the most, he speaks of "the following books" at the end of *BC* 2, and of "this and the following book" in the opening of *BC* 3. We may best think of Appian as having planned *BC* 1–*n*, with *n* to be determined by practice. That *n* ended up being 5 is an accident of Appian's changing focus during composition and was in no way to be foreseen.

⁴⁰Carter's translation (351).

continues in place of the *Civil Wars*. This may be too simple, however: Appian arranges the other books treating ἔθνη in a sequence reflecting the date of their first contact with Rome and brings the story of that contact down to the dawn of the principate. In Egypt's case we cannot know how far back Appian took that contact to be, but it certainly antedated 35 B.C.E., since it included material about Caesar's sojourn with Cleopatra (*BC* 2.90.379), and "contact" in the form of embassies antedated 133 B.C.E. This corroborates the thematic argument that the placement of the *Egyptian History* is deliberate and significant as a culmination of the *Roman History*.

The position of the *Hundred Years' History* (Ἑκατονταετία) and its scope are interesting problems. The only reference to it seems to be at *Illyrian History* 30.86–88. There he writes that events under the Republic (ὑπὸ νεύματι τοῦ δήμου) have been treated separately (ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν), and that "what these emperors [he has mentioned Augustus and Tiberius] captured or acquired under their own right (ἃ δὲ...οἱ αὐτοκράτορες οἶδε ἐκρατύναντο ἢ προσέλαβον ὥς ἴδια αὐτῶν ἔργα) has been treated (εἴρηται) after the actions under the Republic (μετὰ τὰ κοινά). There I will say (ἔρῳ) more about the Moesians." As we saw above, there is the immediate problem of the contradictory internal reference (εἴρηται/ἔρῳ) within one sentence. The name *Hundred Years' History* does not specifically occur, nor do those of the *Dacian* or *Arabian Histories* which also seem to fall into the category of conquests under the emperors (κατὰ τὴν μόναρχον ἐξουσίαν). I suspect that the relative pronoun ἃ stands for an understood ἔθνη because of the two verbs that follow, and that the focus, though still in a preliminary stage of planning, will once again be upon external conquest.⁴¹

The titles of all three books are known only from later citations such as Photius' and are never mentioned in the extant portions of the history. Since the *Illyrian History* is the latest surviving book, we clearly see Appian once again projecting material yet to be covered while still having no precise idea of its contents, titles, or divisions. That the *Hundred Years' History* was finally so titled probably indicates that it covered that span of time, and it is reasonable to think that the *terminus ante quem* for its conclusion was before the Trajanic conquests which formed the *Dacian* and *Arabian Histories*. Because we know that Appian's plans were frequently subject to last-minute changes, even Appian's statement that the imperial material (μετὰ τὰ κοινά, κατὰ τὴν μόναρχον ἐξουσίαν) began "after Egypt" (μετ' Αἴγυπτον) does not mean much. One might suppose that the time covered was from 30 B.C.E. to 69 or 70

⁴¹See Viereck-Roos-Gabba vii; Gabba 1967 xiii and n. 1; Brodersen 1993: 341–43.

C.E. and perhaps reached a climax with Corbulo's or Vespasian's successes in the east. The hundred years ending with Trajan's conquests have also been proposed (see the works in n. 41).

The *Parthian History* promised at various points in the *Roman History* but not present in the extant portions of the work⁴² was an afterthought. There is no mention of it in the *Preface*, though the phrase καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὁμοίως renders its omission there as unremarkable as that of the extant *Illyrian History*. All three surviving internal cross-references refer to it in the future tense (*Syr.* 51.260, *BC* 2.18.67, 5.65.276). Inasmuch as Appian asserts that the *Parthian History* would contain material going at least as far back as Crassus' expedition of 54–53 B.C.E., it would probably have been placed in the series of ethnically arranged books if composed, perhaps after the *Mithridatic Wars*. That Appian still looks forward to it in *BC* 5 argues that it had not been written by the time of the composition of that book. Could Appian have been responding to the same pressure that led a host of authors to compose a *Parthian History* in the wake of Lucius Verus' expedition of 165? Such was the opinion of Nissen, while Reuß saw Trajan's Parthian expedition as a sufficient motivation for the planned book.⁴³ Were Nissen correct, the *Roman History* from the *Syrian History* onwards would likely have been composed after 165, which, though not impossible, is rather improbable for two reasons: it would mean Appian had progressed no further than the *Syrian History* in about fifteen years of composition, whereas the subsequent *BC* 1 was composed no later than 166, as we saw above.

II.iv. Chronology of Composition: Conclusions

The first chronological result is that the preface to the *Civil Wars* postdates the *Preface*.⁴⁴ Internal evidence then shows this sequence: 1) preface to the *Civil Wars*; 2) *BC* 1; 3) *BC* 2; 4) *BC* 3–4; 5) *BC* 5; 6) *Egyptian History*. The *Illyrian*

⁴²It is to be distinguished from the forged one found attached to the *Syrian History* in the tradition: see Schwartz 1896: 217; Viereck-Roos-Gabba vii n.1; Brodersen 1993: 343–44.

⁴³Nissen 240 n.1; Reuß 462.

⁴⁴Carter (x) correctly sees the primacy of the *Preface* on grounds of general probability and comparison with Livy and concludes: "...unless the whole work (improbably in view of its size) was published at the same time [the *Preface*] can only date the first part of it." It is fallacious to confound the date of composition and publication of any or all of the *Roman History*, as here. Even if the *Preface* had been released with, e.g., the first three books, this does not mean that it had not been written years before any or all of them and merely added to them at the time of publication. There is no evidence for revision at all.

History postdates *BC 5*, and almost certainly antedates the *Hundred Years' History* and the *Dacian* and *Arabian Histories*. Appian had no definite idea of how many books would be needed for the *Civil Wars* (and probably the *Egyptian History*) before he actually cut them off by a fiat. References to the prospective *Egyptian History* indicate that the *Mithridatic Wars* (114.557), like the *Civil Wars* (*BC* 1.6.24–25, 2.90.379, 5.1.2), postdate the *Preface*. The reference to the *Parthian History* probably indicates that the *Syrian History* also postdates the *Preface*. The ethnic books after the *Macedonian History* not mentioned in the *Preface* probably postdate it—which is confirmed by stronger evidence in the case of the *Illyrian History*, *Syrian History*, and the *Mithridatic Wars*. The list of works in the *Preface*, which gradually becomes less detailed and finally breaks off, suggests that the first three books (the *Regal*, the *Italian*, and the *Samnite Histories*) were composed before the other six (the *Gallic*, the *Sicilian*, and the *Spanish Histories*, the *Hannibalic War*, and the *Carthaginian* and *Macedonian Histories*), because Appian had already done some preparatory work upon them. The other internal references suggest—but due to Appian's use of tenses cannot prove—that a serial sequence of composition prevailed.

The large number of lost books and the relative lack of programmatic statements in the ethnic books makes an airtight demonstration of serial composition impossible. In fact, simultaneous preparation, already suggested for the *Spanish History* and *Hannibalic War*, and the *Mithridatic Wars* and *BC 1*, might have taken place elsewhere. However, barring more evidence coming to light or better understanding of the extant evidence, it seems best to conclude that the books of the *Roman History* were mostly composed in serial order.

Even given the inherent difficulties of working with ancient writing materials, it is odd that Appian did not just rework the prefaces and skip the apologies for his alterations. We are very fortunate to have the discrepant prospectuses and apologetic updates, and it is worth considering how these statements came to be in, and remain in, the text of the *Roman History*. I can think of only three scenarios (some combinations are also possible). First: as the garrulous debate over the *Illyrian History* at the end of *BC 5* suggests, Appian may simply have had a conversational style and seen nothing irregular in revealing his evolving thought process in writing (cf. also *BC* 5.1.2). Under this scenario, he might have published the books separately or as a complete edition. Second: he might have issued his books as he finished them and written his updates to explain changes as subsequent books of the history were published.⁴⁵ The scenario loses force when we consider that Appian thought it perfectly

⁴⁵So vanderLeest 1988: 65.

possible to append the *Illyrian History* to the much earlier *Macedonian History*, which had evidently not been published and was not therefore beyond recall. Third: he might have planned to issue the entire *Roman History* after thoroughly editing it and excising the irregularities, but been prevented by illness or death.⁴⁶ This last scenario would be strengthened if it could be shown that the promised *Parthian History* was never written. None of these scenarios is incongruent with the theory of serial composition.⁴⁷

III. Appian's Program and Some of Its Effects on His Method of Composition

All of the events in the extant parts of the *Roman History* had already been treated by other authors before Appian wrote, with the probable exception of the occasional references to his own time and the brief autobiographical narrative in fragment 19. He must have brought a purpose greater than a simple dissemination of facts already in the public domain to the composition of the *Roman History*. What that purpose was and the motivation behind it are two separate things. The purpose can be deduced from Appian's own remarks scattered throughout the *Roman History*. It is connected with an admiration of monarchy (especially the monarchy of Appian's own day) and a desire to explain and depict the Roman rise to world dominance and the concomitant extension of the benefits of the monarchy to the entire world. To this extent, Appian's program has long been understood, especially because Appian makes his interest in these concepts quite clear at various points.⁴⁸ However, these themes can equally animate history, biography, panegyric, and other forms of literature. It is therefore also necessary to analyze Appian's method of pursuing these themes. We will find that, while he employs historiographical conventions as an armature upon which to build his work, what he has written is different from a "history," if we think of the latter in its classic form as a connected narrative concerned to show the interplay of cause and effect in historical

⁴⁶So too, on the basis of the number and sequence of books that were published, Brodersen 1993: 354. Had the books been published piecemeal, it is less likely that they would have come down to us in the order Appian planned in the *Preface*.

⁴⁷See Luce 1958: 13. On the other hand, if, as will be argued below, Appian was writing for an Alexandrian (and possibly somewhat broader) audience relatively ignorant of the details of Roman history, then the argument counted, not the historical details (which any good orator knew the average listener or reader would not check: cf. Gorg. *Hel.* 11). Appian might have published his books as he finished them without troubling to track down errors and inconsistencies his intended readers would have been unable or disinclined to discover or refute.

⁴⁸Fundamental discussions in Gabba 1956: 3–9, 1967: xvi; Luce 1961, 1964. Recent treatments: Gowing 1992: 35–36, Hose 167–73 (unaware of Luce 1964, however).

developments in order principally to instruct or divert the reader. Rather, Appian's history, if we should even call it such, is animated by a spirit of advocacy; and the presentation of historical data has been thoroughly conditioned by a desire to establish the validity and inevitability of his themes.⁴⁹

III.i. The Evidence for Appian's Program

The initial books, arranged by ἔθνος where possible, are meant to demonstrate the traits of the Romans that made them worthy and capable of governing the world, mostly by showing them in action.⁵⁰ This is clear at *Pr.* 11.43–44, where the traits to be highlighted are ἀρετή, φερεπονία, and ταλαιπωρία. The ethnic histories, indeed, were expressly written to highlight the ἀρετή of the Romans in their encounters with each people (*Pr.* 12.46: με...τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ἐντελῇ καθ' ἑκάστον ἔθνος ἰδεῖν ἐθέλοντα), and Appian also restates his interest in the Romans' ἀρετή at *Pr.* 15.61. The first book, the fragmentary *Regal History*, treats the period of the kings: it seems, therefore, that Appian traces the Roman virtues from the mythical beginnings of their history. Most of the rest of the ethnic books carry the contemplation of those virtues through the Republic down to the dawn of the principate. Even in the midst of the civil wars, Appian still notes the existence of Roman ἀρετή (*BC* 5.113.472). Two of the last books of the *Roman History*, the *Arabian* and *Dacian Histories*, were likewise ethnic books and very likely carried on the examination of Roman virtues very near to Appian's time. A significant result is that Appian evidently thinks the virtues to be a sufficiently fundamental part of Roman character that they are not conditioned upon the Romans' mode of government nor somehow eradicated or suppressed by civil wars (see also n. 55 below).

⁴⁹Gowing (1992: 4): "each facet of Appian's...Triumviral narrative should be interpreted in light of [his]...purposes and experiences, insofar as we can know or reconstruct them." This observation is certainly true of the entire *Roman History*, as I think he would agree. I see no reason to disagree with Brodersen (1993: 360) and Marincola (30 n. 149) when they suggest that Appian was not indifferent to his readers' enjoyment; I do think it was far down his list of priorities, however, and the evidence they advance (*Syr.* 207, *BC* 1.6.24) is not very compelling.

⁵⁰The virtues of the Romans' antagonists (*Pr.* 12.48) form a parallel theme: excellent enemies highlight the even greater (military) virtues of their conquerors. Swain (1996: 250) notes that Appian's presentation of Roman expansion is "not...obviously anti-Roman" despite frank admissions of "underhand diplomacy," *vel sim*. Without ever asserting that the ends justify the means, Appian honestly confronts incidents of dishonorable Roman conduct. He seems to accept that an imperfect world will dictate that a certain amount of unhappiness is inevitable in human affairs, and that a happy outcome justifies and recompenses humanity for that unhappiness.

In another passage, Appian relates that Gaius Caesar established the monarchy while preserving the forms of the Republic (*Pr.* 6.22–23), and that under the Empire “the city was particularly beautified, revenues grew very great, and everything proceeded in a vast and tranquil peace to a secure state of well-being” (ἡ τε πόλις μάλιστα κατεκοσμήθη καὶ ἡ πρόσοδος ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ηὔξήθη καὶ πάντα ἐν εἰρήνῃ μακρὰ καὶ εὐσταθεῖ προῆλθεν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀσφαλῆ. *Pr.* 7.24). The *telos* towards which “πάντα” was moving was not simply Roman rule, but monarchical rule—the monarchy of Appian’s day. Appian is a convinced believer in the monarchy, as the terms εἰρήνη μακρὰ καὶ εὐσταθής, εὐδαιμονία, the subsequent ὁμόνοιαν (*BC* 1.6.24), εὐταξία and εὐδαιμόνισμα (*BC* 4.16.61, 64) show.⁵¹

To these unproven assertions of imperial beatitude Appian adds another element that frequently recurs in the course of the *Roman History*, divine influence. The divinity assists Roman expansion in many ways, but it appears most interestingly when Appian thinks about the rise of the monarchy.⁵² We discover that divine action subverts the Republican defense by weakening Pompey’s resolve at a critical moment in the interest of establishing the Empire of Appian’s day: “but the divinity ordained these things for the beginning of the

⁵¹Though requiring a few modifications, Luce’s discussion (1961: 25–27) of Appian’s convinced monarchism is still the best. See also Mazzarino II.2.188; Gabba 1967: xv–xvi, xxi–xxii; Brodersen 1993: 356. For a different view, see Gowing 1992: 47–48, 281–82, who argues that Appian is critical of *principes* while perhaps admiring the principate. The distinction is salutary, but I disagree with his view that Appian is concerned very much one way or another with individuals in his history, and I cannot agree that Appian favored the Republic: what he admired in the Romans is independent of the form of their constitution (as I argued in the running text immediately above). See the text at n. 78.

⁵²On divine influence see above all Goldmann 27–44, esp. 29–31. Plutarch also (somewhat inconsistently) invokes divine intervention to explain some pivotal moments in history, as Swain 1989 has shown. The ascription of momentous changes in history to divine action are probably conventional to some degree (as Swain 1996: 250 n. 43 sees), and it is not particularly surprising to find a number of cases where Plutarch and Appian have sometimes individually, sometimes simultaneously arrived at the idea of divine intervention, or been prompted to it by a source (e.g., *BC* 2.81.339 = *Plut. Caes.* 45.7). Plutarch even sees some divine action in the rise of the monarchy, but it is nowhere near as coherent and extensive as in Appian’s narrative: see the evidence collected in Swain 1989: 273, 288–92. Appian, an independent (though not profound) thinker, adopted and adapted ideas (or “beliefs”) he encountered in a lifetime of education, reading, and exposure to other sources of experience, and the development of his program and the refinement of his ideas must have proceeded organically, with the one nourishing the other.

present all-embracing government” (ἀλλὰ τάδε μὲν ᾠκονόμει θεὸς ἐς ἀρχὴν τῆσδε τῆς νῦν ἐπεχούσης τὰ πάντα ἡγεμονίας, *BC* 2.71.299).⁵³ In the course of the war of Mutina, Appian relates that Cicero sent an aggressive and distorted senatorial dispatch to Antony, though he does not see any motive for Cicero’s hatred. He aporetically ascribes this to divine action, “since, as it seems, the divinity was confounding the commonwealth in the interest of change and intended evils for Cicero himself” (ὥς ἔοικε, τοῦ δαιμονίου τὰ κοινὰ ἐς μεταβολὴν ἐνοχλοῦντος καὶ αὐτῷ Κικέρωνι κακῶς ἐπιννοῦντος, *BC* 3.61.252).⁵⁴ Later, in his account of the Triumviral proscriptions, Appian writes: “and these things did not come to pass in some undistinguished city nor in a weak little kingdom, but the divinity shook the most powerful of cities, one ruling so many peoples by land and by sea, evidently bringing it into its present well-ordered state over a long period” (καὶ τάδε ἐγένετο οὐκ ἐν ἰδιώτιδι πόλει οὐδὲ ἐν ἀσθενεῖ καὶ μικρῷ βασιλείῳ, ἀλλὰ τὴν δυνατωτάτην καὶ τοσοῦτων ἐθνῶν καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἡγεμονίδα διέσειεν ὁ θεός, ἐκ πολλοῦ ἄρα ἐς τὴν νῦν καθιστάμενος εὐταξίαν, *BC* 4.16.61).⁵⁵ Appian portrays the divinity as having brought the Republic down through civil violence specifically to establish the present order. Given the context of these statements, it is clear that Appian thinks that divine action can be painful in the short run, especially for its agents, but that the beneficial end outweighs the unpleasant

⁵³The term ἡγεμονία ought to mean “empire” in the sense of *Weltreich*. The modifiers τῆσδε and νῦν make it clear that the Empire of Appian’s day is meant, and accordingly I take the concept of monarchy to be implicit in the term as it is used here.

⁵⁴Carter’s (189) translation of τὰ κοινὰ as “public affairs” seems too weak. See Luce 1961: 25 n. 32.

⁵⁵Carter (216) translates, “...which was shaken by the divine power which had blessed her with good order from ages past until the present.” The hyperbaton of εὐταξίαν is a bit jarring, but understandable (if not a scribal problem) as lending emphasis (*BC* 1.65.297 at πιλοφορούντων is somewhat comparable); but as the parallel passages quoted just above in the text show, phrases such as ἐς τὴν νῦν...εὐταξίαν are clearly Appian’s complimentary references to his own time (so, I infer, agree Goldmann 31 n. 41 and vanderLeest 1989: 131 n. 7). Appian’s point is that the proscriptions were a passage to a happier time, exactly the opposite of Carter’s implicit argument that the happiness of the Republic was shaken by the proscriptions (the disregard of the tense of the participle and of ἄρα are also diagnostic of the error). Note that the collapse of the Republic has not altered Appian’s view of Rome’s power or status as a ruler of great peoples by land and sea. The good qualities Appian is interested in were apparently unaffected by the internal upheavals which brought about the monarchy.

transition.⁵⁶ However sincere we may take Appian's belief in ὁ θεός (*vel sim.*) to have been, the ascription of the transition to divine action obviates the necessity to seek or describe a mundane (but probably messy) causation that might clutter his narrative with issues perhaps unconnected to or at variance with his purposes in writing.

Appian must have been aware that not everyone shared his rosy view of the imperial monarchy, and in order to demonstrate its superiority to what had preceded it, he conceived of a separate section of the *Roman History*, the *Civil Wars*, which tacitly advocates the Roman monarchy by contrasting it with the violent disorder and breakdown of the Republic under the competition of the stasiarchs. The *Civil Wars* is in fact a collection of *staseis*, as the title Ἐμφύλια already suggests. The modern habit of translating the title as *Civil Wars*, while understandable because of the subject matter, carries with it the implicit suggestion that Appian is interested in their complex causes and development, whereas these factors barely enter into the narrative. His method is practical and matter-of-fact, he does not clutter his presentation with historical or philosophical argumentation, and as usual he avoids polemic.⁵⁷ Results, rather than the process, are what count to Appian: in the course of ever-worsening factional strife, occasional episodes of monarchical power bring the *staseis* to an abrupt halt (the point is not lost on the reader), though the strife breaks out anew once power is again divided.⁵⁸ For Appian, *stasis* is important (he is of course not alone in this), and he registers his opinion that *stasis*—i.e., internal

⁵⁶See Gowing 1990: 178 n. 58. Swain (1996: 250 n. 43), with Goldmann, sees the role of the divinity limited to a "Zusatzfunktion." If ὁ θεός has a supplementary role, it seems to me more in the area of allowing Appian to reduce complex causes to a single irrational one, which he need not explain: words such as ὥκονόμει and διέσειεν imply direct, substantial action. Pelling (1989: 202–3) rightly emphasizes the respectability of invoking supernatural causation while simultaneously seeing that Appian uses supernatural explanations in "controlling his narrative." See also the discussion in n. 52.

⁵⁷See Swain 1996: 250: "The narrative always unfolds in a matter-of-fact way and each issue is taken on its own merits."

⁵⁸Discussion of the pertinent passages (*BC* 1.3.9, 1.3.12, 1.4.16, 1.6.24, 1.16.67, 1.105.491, 2.20.72, and 2.23.84) in Luce 1961: 26–27. Appian's position is to be distinguished from "the ends justify the means." The latter is an argument for those actually using unsanctioned means to reach an end, impossible for Appian as a historian of the distant past. In addition, bad results are discreditable to Appian despite (perhaps) creditable means. Consider the exacerbation of the civil wars by the precise good qualities Appian strives to highlight elsewhere (the difference between the stasiarchs' κατ'ερίαν ἄτρυτον at *BC* 1.6.24 and the Romans' laudable ταλαίπωρία is minimal at best).

conflict—is the only thing that can bring a great empire down (*Pr.* 10.42: ὃ μόνως ἀρχαὶ μεγάλαι καταλύονται).

The *Civil Wars* thus describes the results of the breakdown of the Republic and the emergence of monarchy, thanks to the final destruction of all rivals for power: “in this way the Roman state came around through many different types of *stasis* to concord and monarchy” (*BC* 1.6.24: ὧδε μὲν ἐκ στάσεων ποικίλων ἡ πολιτεία Ῥωμαίοις ἐς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ μοναρχίαν περιέστη). *μοναρχία* is best translated as “monarchical power,” but in the sense of “sole rule” rather than “kingship.”⁵⁹ Appian recognizes that the Roman emperors combined both senses of the word—“they are *de facto* kings in all respects” (*Pr.* 6.23: εἰσὶ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πάντα βασιλεῖς).

“The Roman people and the senate often fell into factional strife against one another” (ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ πολλάκις ἐς ἀλλήλους...ἐστασίασαν, *BC* 1.1.1): the first words of the *Civil Wars* establish that the Republican form of government was characterized by divided power and consequent *stasis*. Appian seems to have thought that *stasis*, violent or not, was an inevitable accompaniment to the functioning of the Republic, thanks to the diffusion of power (here drawn in the simplified terms of “senate” and “people”). It was from the various *staseis* (i.e., from Republican government) that the state came around into concord and monarchy (ἐς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ μοναρχίαν). Consider the two terms Appian uses to mark the happy endpoint: concord, the opposite of *stasis*, and *monarchia*, the opposite of diffused power, the cause of *stasis*. The diametric contrast is not accidental.

Appian is well aware that the *staseis* were nonviolent until Ti. Gracchus, but Gracchus’ death marks an important worsening of the *staseis*, not a fundamental change in Roman character or the Republic.⁶⁰ Before Gracchus,

⁵⁹Luce 1961 is again fundamental. In particular, he notes Appian’s impatience with terminological precision (21–24), which extends to terms denoting monarchical offices and power. Appian characteristically uses terms in an imprecise way so as to emphasize a general concept rather than to define carefully, which Luce rightly attributes to Appian’s need to reach an audience ignorant of the Roman constitution.

⁶⁰Appian seems to be ready for critics who will point to the civil wars after Nero’s reign as evidence against the monarchy. He is careful always to point out that the *staseis* under the Republic were chronic problems, and recurred constantly (οὐκ ἀνέσχον ἔτι αἱ στάσεις ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ μύσει, *BC* 1.2.5; καὶ πρῶτον ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ τόδε μύσος γενόμενον οὐ διέλιπεν, αἰεὶ τινος ὁμοίου γιγνομένου παρὰ μέρος, *BC* 1.17.71, both referring to Ti. Gracchus’ death). *BC* 1.66.302 also shows how Appian views *stasis* as stemming from dispersed power: when Cinna raises forces to march on Rome, “many

“there were no acts of internecine violence, but only disagreements and rivalries within the limits of the law, and they settled these by yielding to one another with great respect” (οὐ μὴν τι χειρῶν ἔργον ἔμφυλον ἦν, ἀλλὰ διαφοραὶ μόναι καὶ ἔριδες ἔννομοι, καὶ τάδε μετὰ πολλῆς αἰδοῦς εἰκόντες ἀλλήλοις διετίθεντο, *BC* 1.1.1), whereas “no sword was ever brought into an assembly, nor was there internecine murder, before the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, at any rate.... He was the first to be killed in *stasis*” (ξίφος δὲ οὐδὲν πω παρενεχθὲν ἐς ἐκκλησίαν οὐδὲ φόνον ἔμφυλον, πρὶν γε Τιβέριος Γράκχος δημαρχῶν...πρῶτος ὅδε ἐν στάσει ἀπώλετο, *BC* 1.2.4). Starting with this “first” victim of murder, Appian selects examples of φόνος ἔμφυλος and “acts of internecine violence” χειρῶν ἔργον ἔμφυλον in the *Civil Wars* to illustrate an ever-worsening series of *staseis*, with the seriousness of each offense incrementally greater than the one before.⁶¹ The *staseis* might have played themselves out into the destruction of everyone and everything; but, thanks to divine intervention, they were channeled into a positive end (ῥακονόμει θεός) as the painful birth pangs of the imperial monarchy.

The *Civil Wars* thus focuses closely upon *staseis*, the opposite of the concord of monarchy, and therefore advocates the latter by contrast. Naturally, the problem is set in terms that favor Appian's program, and problems with monarchy *per se* are never raised. On the other hand, Appian's only direct comment about the Republic is phrased with an unexpected pugnacity suppressed elsewhere. He writes that Brutus and Cassius were fighting for the illusory ideal of “democracy”—“an attractive name, but always inexpedient” (ὑπὲρ δημοκρατίας, ὀνόματος εὐειδοῦς μὲν, ἀλυσιτελοῦς δὲ αἰεὶ, *BC* 4.133.560).⁶² Appian knows that Cassius and Brutus were acting on behalf of an aristocratic oligarchy (i.e., the Republic), but calls it “democracy.” This use of “democracy” for “oligarchy” or “Republic” has parallels, but I would not be

other powerful men” came to join him, “to whom the peace of the state was disagreeable.”

⁶¹Steidle (404) rightly sees Appian's sharp focus on the “Gewalttätigkeit, Ungesetzlichkeit und kriegsähnliche oder kriegerische Aktionen” that characterized the *staseis*, although he argues for neither a crescendo in the *staseis* nor their use in advocating monarchy. I reserve a detailed demonstration of this crescendo for future treatment.

⁶²Hahn 1993: 372 portrays Appian as a secret dissenter who would only admit that the Empire (thus monarchy) kept the peace, and accordingly suppresses the last three words of this passage. We all reconstruct history based upon the sum of our experience: could the Hungarian Hahn have been reconstructing a picture of Appian based upon his experience as an intellectual in a Soviet satellite state? The tendentious partial citation of the phrase in question is interesting, given his excellent work elsewhere. See n. 91 below.

using a loaded, overcomplimentary term for it.⁶³ The concession that “democracy” is attractive surely indicates that Appian knew (or knew of) people who held that opinion, especially in connection with the Republic. The swift and decisive undercutting of the concession, with the αἰεὶ acting as a sort of exclamation mark, seems like a brief eruption of personal feeling (as opposed to the straightforward opinions or explanations we encounter elsewhere) rarely encountered in the *Roman History*.⁶⁴

The focus on *stasis* naturally explains why the *Civil Wars* is divided according to the generals (or factional leaders) who fought one another (*Pr.* 14.59, *BC* 1.6.25). Appian’s case is served by depictions of violent disagreement, open violence, and atrocity, the very stuff of *stasis*, which are the outward signs of social decay making his case that the Republic suffered from an inherent instability: the peace and concord of the imperial monarchy are blessings. He does not concern himself with politics, social problems, and other mechanisms of that decay except as they had inevitably to be discussed as preliminaries to open conflict; when he is forced to discuss them, he streamlines his discussion and gives only the requisite details to make the narrative of the *stasis* in question comprehensible to his readers.⁶⁵

This streamlining of the narrative is very important to keep in mind. For example, the *Civil Wars* is not meant to be a general history of the Empire from 133 B.C.E., since Appian covers the external history for that period in the appropriate ethnic books that bring the history down to the dawn of the principate (the first three books and the *Hannibalic War*, which treat periods of a necessarily limited duration, are understandable exceptions).⁶⁶ Appian

⁶³Appian is also capable of using the term to refer neutrally to the Republic at *Ill.* 30.86. In general, see Hahn 1968: 115–16 and de Ste. Croix 321–23 with nn. 49, 51 (who calls Appian’s remark “sneering”).

⁶⁴Two other examples (*pace* Luce 1958: 13): the famous attack on philosophers at *Mith.* 28.111 and the attack on the degenerate condition of the population of Rome at *BC* 2.120.504–6.

⁶⁵He is not ignorant of the deeper causes behind historical events: he knows what worsened the *staseis* following the assassination of Drusus at *BC* 1.34.150–51, and presumably he knows that similar forces had helped to give rise to the violence in the first place.

⁶⁶The *Gallie History* contains material as late as 52 B.C.E. (21); the *Sicilian History* as late as 62 B.C.E. (fr. 7: see Scardigli 229–32); the *Spanish History*, 26/25 B.C.E. (102.443–44); the *Libyan History*, 44 B.C.E. with a passing reference to 29 B.C.E. (136.647); the *Illyrian History*, 33 B.C.E. (28.83: cf. 30.87 on the stopping point); the *Syrian History*, 40 B.C.E. (51.259). The *Mithridatic Wars* goes beyond the king’s death to that of his son Pharnaces in 47 B.C.E. (120.595).

frequently refers his reader to the appropriate ethnic book when external affairs are touched upon in the *BC*.⁶⁷ In what practically amounts to a diagnostic passage, he elaborately excuses and apologizes for including the extraneous Social War in *BC* 1: "When this war ended, it nourished other *staseis* and more powerful factional leaders who no longer used the proposal of laws or demagoguery against one another, but entire armies. For these reasons (διὰ τᾶδε) I placed it in this account: it began in *stasis* at Rome, and it turned into another *stasis* far worse" (34.151). If Appian apologizes so for the intrusion of what is after all a small part of *BC* 1 (15 of 121 chapters), it seems unlikely that he has gratuitously added a lot of other material which does not (in his mind) bear directly upon *stasis*. It is in this light that we should consider his apology for Egyptian material in *BC* 5. The *synkrisis* of Alexander and Caesar at the close of *BC* 2 is an obvious exception; it is to be attributed to the influence of Plutarch (see below at n. 106), and shows that Appian does not follow his program with mechanical consistency (which would be unlikely in any event). An overriding concern with *stasis* readily explains the long gaps between the *staseis* in *BC* 1 and the condensation of narrative elsewhere.⁶⁸ We must look to Appian's expressed interests and original program to explain unevenness of treatment or bias before we resort to the sources.⁶⁹

⁶⁷In *BC* 2, for example, Appian refers the reader back to his *Gallic History* for Caesar's exploits during his proconsulship (17.61), and forward to the *Parthian History* for the details of Crassus' defeat at Carrhae (18.67) and to the *Egyptian History* for the details of Caesar's sojourn in that kingdom (*BC* 2.90.379). Backward references might be interpreted as due merely to economy of presentation; the forward references, however, represent a conscious desire to postpone material extraneous to the issues at hand to a more suitable place.

⁶⁸In contradistinction to Meyer's (1910 [=1894]: 400) view, expressive of his age: "die ungleichmäßige Disposition des Stoffs in Appians Bürgerkriegen gehört unzweifelhaft der Quelle an," Gabba (1956: 111–12) attributes the *stringatezza* and *concettosità* of the first portion of *BC* 1 to its putative origin in another author's introductory remarks. Cuff (1967: 187) first correctly traced uneven treatment in *BC* 1 to Appian's program. McGing (502) and I (1995: 410) have also noted sketchy treatment of preliminary or digressive material in the *Mithridatic Wars* and in *BC* 2, respectively.

⁶⁹Forcefully expressed by Cuff 1983: 164. Gómez Espelosín (407), while seeing narrative flaws in the *Spanish History* similar to those seen by Gabba (1956: 109–15) in *BC* 1, adds: "...despite this somewhat unsatisfactory overall impression, from the beginning there seems to be a clear awareness of the unity of the whole book, maintained throughout the story with internal cross references and in an attempt to avoid dispersing the reader's attention while creating an air of expectation." Gowing (1992: 160) rightly looks first to Appian's interests, rather than to a source, in order to explain the sketchy treatment of Cicero in the Triumviral narrative: see n. 80.

As we have seen, the ethnic books treated primarily the military and diplomatic side of Rome's expansion. There was thus no place in them for a Polybian-style description of the Roman constitution, nor would we expect it: out of place in any single ethnic book, it would also have been difficult for Appian to write, since his knowledge of the Republican constitution was shaky at best.⁷⁰ Positive evidence that Appian omitted such a description is not lacking. We have seen that Appian does not hesitate to refer back to earlier books, and yet he repeatedly finds it necessary to gloss the most basic aspects of Roman life throughout the *Roman History*—a waste of time if he might have referred to an earlier treatment. Whoever constituted Appian's expected audience, he thinks they know so little about Roman customs that he feels the need to explain the intermediate rank of the *equites*—as basic a fact of life in Appian's time as in the late Republic (τοὺς καλουμένους ἱππέας, οἱ τὴν ἀξιῶσιν εἰσι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῶν δημοτῶν ἐν μέσῳ, *BC* 1.22.91: cf. 2.13.47, restated in nearly the same words). There are countless other examples.

Appian's explanations of Roman institutions are his own, and are rightly understood as intended for a Greek audience, a fact that has not been challenged in living memory. Nevertheless, no one has pursued the ramifications of this state of affairs to the logical conclusion: nowhere in the *Civil Wars* or in earlier parts of his work does he give his readers (who he thinks need to be told the relative status of the *equites*!) the necessary background information to understand Republican political and social life. His occasional glosses of individual customs and facts of Roman life form a sufficient proof that he is aware of the problem, and since he is aware of it, we must conclude that for the most part his readers' ignorance did not trouble him. This can only be true if what he desires to make them understand (i.e., the content of his narrative) is not connected to the intricacies of Roman politics or social structure. In other words, we have yet another strong piece of evidence that Appian has not written standard political history in any portion of the *Roman History* (least obviously but most significantly in the *Civil Wars*).⁷¹ If we take Appian's expectations of his audience into account, the immediate corollary is that he must consciously simplify all nonessential elements (politics, social problems) in the *Civil Wars*

⁷⁰Shown extensively by Luce 1958 *passim*. Further evidence that Appian never put an exposition of the Roman constitution in an ethnic book lies in the fact that he used the general forum provided by his *Preface* to give the geography of the entire Roman empire, which was likewise unsuited to any individual book.

⁷¹This alone (*pace* Gowing 1992: 287) may be enough to explain why Dio never seems to have used Appian as a source; the *Roman History* was aimed at a very different audience than a statesman with access to first-rate information about Roman institutions.

(and the *Roman History* in general), drawing them in broad, schematized lines that could be understood with a minimum of background information.⁷² On those occasions when certain characters' motivations or extraordinary situations cannot be understood from a basic understanding of human nature, Appian goes to the trouble of giving an *ad hoc* explanation, often in the form of a short gloss, though sometimes at greater length. Sometimes we can find Appian himself inventing a plausible gloss when he cannot understand counterintuitive behavior. This is most clearly visible when Appian describes the unofficial meeting of the senate at M. Calpurnius Bibulus' house during the course of his consulship with Caesar (*BC* 2.11.37). Evidently wanting to explain why the senate was meeting unofficially though in the presence of a consul (and expecting an audience that knows no better), he infers that both consuls were necessary to convene the senate, which is simply not true (though it does serve to simplify a much more complex situation).⁷³

In the *Preface*, Appian writes as though he intends the material to be covered in the *Civil Wars* to crown the work, and plans to end it when "Egypt came under Roman rule and the Roman state turned into a monarchy" (*Pr.* 14.60). In other words, all Egyptian material was to be subsumed into the *Civil Wars*. By the time of the preface to *BC* 1, Appian is focusing more upon Egypt, "which was the longest-lived empire until that time and the most powerful one after Alexander, and the sole one left for the Romans so as to form their present Empire" (ἡ χρονιωτάτη τε ἦν ἐς τότε καὶ δυνατωτάτη μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀρχὴ καὶ μόνη Ῥωμαίοις ἔλειπεν ἐς τὰ νῦν ὄντα, *BC* 1.5.21). The emphasis on Egypt is matched by Actium's emergence as the climax of the series of ever worsening *staseis* that make up the civil wars ("the last of the *staseis* and the greatest action, which took place at Actium," *BC* 1.6.25)⁷⁴ and given expression in the prospective *Egyptian History*, which had only (it seems) been announced in the immediately preceding book. We saw above that, when he wrote the preface to *BC* 1, Appian appears to have been undecided as to whether Actium belonged in the *BC* as its climax or in the *EH* as the launching-point for a treatment presumably ending with annexation in 30 B.C.E. By the opening lines of *BC* 5, the point becomes moot as Appian decides to include everything after 35 B.C.E. in the *EH*. Actium and the annexation of Egypt thus form a remarkable

⁷²This is similar to what Pelling calls "fabrication of a context" in Plutarch's *Roman Lives* (1980: 130).

⁷³For another example of Appian constructing a false context for the sake of compactness in his narrative, see Bucher 1995: 407–9, though there I wrongly attributed the resulting historical error too much to Appian's reliance on memory.

⁷⁴See nn. 32 and 33 above.

confluence of Appian's themes, which persuaded him first to postpone the conquest of Egypt into its own specialized treatment, then to place the climactic battle of Actium into the new portion of the work, and finally to add in material reaching as far back as 35 B.C.E. The preface to the *Civil Wars* reflects an intermediate stage of thinking. Once we realize that fact, we can better understand why Appian rethought the *termini* for *BC* 5: in postponing the last and greatest *stasis* to the *EH* he decapitated the *BC*. The *Egyptian History* had become important enough to Appian to warrant sacrificing the structural integrity of the *Civil Wars*, and as a result he suffered the latter to trail off in a single book performing the anticlimactic job of clearing the way for the *EH* after Philippi.

Given his program, we might expect Appian to portray Octavian, the first monarch and conqueror of Egypt, with special sympathy. In the event, Gabba found that Appian, despite his monarchist stance, does not write an account consistently favorable to Octavian. It is important to realize why this is so. When, for example, Appian writes that the divinity violently shook the Republic with the proscriptions in the interest of establishing the order of Appian's day, Octavian, a player in that drama, is an agent of divine will, and Appian has no reason to portray him with any special sympathy, but is free to pick and choose among his sources to get all the facts he wants—favorable or not.⁷⁵ The same is true generally. Other factional leaders are portrayed with a realistic mixture of good and bad traits: Appian is interested in unbridled ambition, lust for power, and unabating endurance (*BC* 1.6.24, 2.1.3, 2.77.322, etc.), but also acknowledges Sulla's courage in relinquishing his monarchical power (*BC* 1.3.10), Caesar's brilliant victory at Pharsalus (*BC* 1.4.13), and Pompey's prowess (*BC* 1.4.15, 2.86.363).

⁷⁵Gabba (1984: 69–70): Appian “sometimes followed traditions favorable to Augustus, sometimes the opposite, without attempting to harmonize them; and...this fact is to be explained in terms of a complete indifference to political events and decisions and ideologies which belonged to the distant past.” I agree, though Gabba does not see that Appian's “indifference” (Gowing would call it “objectivity”: see n. 80) is not just an accident of Appian's birthdate but due to his focus being elsewhere and deliberate streamlining principles in his narrative. Gowing (1992: 58–59; 90–91) perceptively sees that “if a particular action reflected poorly on his subject, then that was, as far as Appian was concerned, merely historical fact. Appian's admiration of Augustus and his achievement is patent, but that did not require that the means to the ends be construed as entirely laudable.” Torrens (Combes-Dounous-Torrens 1994: xviii) also notices Appian's lack of a partisan stance.

Caesar is a good example of the tool in the hands of destiny: he enabled the rise of the monarchy by helping to destroy what had gone before; but, just as Pompey was subverted in part by divine hindrance so that the Empire might be founded (*BC* 2.67.278, 2.71.298–99),⁷⁶ so, too, Caesar had to go, to make way for the future, “for what happened to Caesar had to happen” (χρῆν γὰρ ἃ ἐχρῆν Κάισαρι γενέσθαι, *BC* 2.116.489). After a close analysis, Gabba also perceived that Appian’s assignment of blame for the Civil War of 49 B.C.E. is about even: Gabba rightly identified Appian’s remoteness from events as one cause; another lies in the probability that Appian’s narrative is a thorough mixture of diverse source material selected to depict (in the case of the *BC*) a series of violent *staseis*, not to create a consistent portrait of one leader or another. Appian’s program and method make it unprofitable to count up statements for or against stasiarchs in order to make deductions about the bias (and hence, perhaps, the identity) of his sources.⁷⁷

In eschewing polemics and explicit argumentation about the virtues of the monarchy and the flaws of the Republic, Appian exhibits a remarkable degree of restraint.⁷⁸ Schwartz, who was not disposed to credit Appian with originality or sufficient seriousness, long since recognized that with regard to *römische Erfolge*, “er will sie den Griechen nicht durch rhetorische Enkomien, sondern durch Vorführung der Tatsachen mitteilen.”⁷⁹ Gowing has rightly demonstrated that Appian is not at the mercy of his sources in exhibiting their biases, though

⁷⁶We must ask if Appian intends divine orchestration of events as an exculpation for the sins of the players. Views differ. Gabba (1956: 139) thought that the role of fortune, closely allied to divine action, “completely devalued” Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus. This would seem to imply that his criminal actions were similarly devalued; Hahn (1964: 180–82), on the other hand, thought that Appian’s invocation of the gods and fate at Pharsalus did not exempt Pompey from blame for his own failings. Hahn seems to be on the right track, and Gowing (quoted in n. 75 above) seems closer still. I think Appian’s view could best be summed up by the biblical verse at *Ev.Matt.* 18:7.

⁷⁷Gabba 1956: 120–40, 1984: 169–70. In *BC* 3, Magnino (1983: 119) sees an attempt by Appian to strike a balance in his presentation between favoritism towards Octavian and sympathy for Antony in spite of the fact that he probably used Augustus’ memoirs—in other words, Appian was hardly bound by the political *indirizzo* of his sources and could intelligently distinguish between them and counter source bias by taking information from diverse accounts.

⁷⁸See how far Dio (44.2) goes with the premise δημοκρατία... ὄνομα... εὐσχημον ἔχει as opposed to Appian’s comments at *BC* 4.133.560.

⁷⁹Schwartz 1896: 217; more recently Hahn 1993: 396: he desired “lediglich durch die Darstellung selbst, durch den schlichten ‘Tatsachenbericht,’ den Leser zu beeinflussen.” Swain (1996: 250) also sees Appian’s matter-of-fact approach to presenting history.

the reason for it is not objectivity, as Gowing suggests.⁸⁰ Appian is not objective in putting forward his case for monarchy: despite his restraint, his strong preference for monarchy is clear. The objectivity Gowing sees is a result of Appian's lack of identification with the individual characters in his history, especially when he is streamlining his narrative to focus on a small group of persons chiefly concerned with diplomacy and warfare in the ethnic books and the stasiarchs in the *Civil Wars*, as we have seen. Put another way, Appian's distance from the events and his interest in the broader, teleological movement of history gives him no reason to create heroes or monsters. Much of Appian's "objectivity" is an artifact of our tendency (by no means always mistaken) to define the lack of objectivity by partisan bias towards prominent historical figures.⁸¹

IV. Analysis

Why write a sizeable work recapitulating material already in the public domain? Clearly, to argue a new interpretation. The *Roman History* was written to perform a function of steadily increasing complexity and evolved accordingly; we have followed the traces of that evolution in the extant portions of the work. Roman success in expansion and survival demonstrated the Romans' superiority and worthiness to rule. The failure of the Republic in the awful civil wars proved by contrast the superiority of the monarchy that succeeded it.

Appian's argument is weak, amounting to little more than the enthymeme "the Republic was a bad form of government because it bred violence; the Empire, which has avoided just these evils, is not a bad form of government and is therefore good." A critical (or skeptical) observer might immediately point out

⁸⁰Gowing's (1992: 143–61) treatment of Cicero in the Triumviral narrative offers a good presentation of his case for Appian's "objectivity." It is worthwhile to reconsider his explanation for Appian's scanty, historically inadequate treatment of Cicero: "The reasons for Appian's treatment perhaps lie in the nature and purpose of his work. Appian expresses a consistent interest in the military conflicts and preference for generals. Cicero fought with words, not weapons, and political intrigues interested Appian less than the actual conflicts they engendered." Now that we understand Appian's program better, we can see that Appian's "interest in military conflicts and preference for generals" is not a basic reason for his treatment of Cicero but is itself an external symptom of his underlying program. Cicero was not much of a stasiarch, and accordingly his role has been minimized because Appian is focusing on the triumvirs and assassins, as promised in both prefaces. Gowing rightly sees that the comparatively extensive description of his death is due to special interests animating the account of the proscriptions.

⁸¹See also Gowing 1992: 281–82, again noting Appian's lack of a partisan stance and willingness to let individuals (in this case Octavian) bask in a negative light of their own making.

the obvious: were the Republic ever so bad, this in itself still does not mean that the Empire was better, even if it did manage to keep the peace (in Appian's day, at any rate) better than its predecessor. Yet Appian straightforwardly advances this argument seemingly (tendentiously?) unaware of its flaws. The only way to explain this (barring the untenable solution of seeing the man as a fool) is to recognize that Appian is not at all disinterested, but uncritically takes the apodosis of the condition he poses as his argument as unquestionably or self-evidently true. The same reasoning can be used to analyze the other fundamental argument of his case, which might be posed "failure and defeat are punishments of unworthiness; the Romans have survived longer than any other empire against frightful odds, and have conquered all other peoples (that count); therefore they are the people most worthy to rule by process of elimination."

These arguments are a convinced believer's *post hoc* justifications of the *status quo* of his own day. If the justifiability of the premises is less important to Appian than the demonstration that his propositions (if accepted at face value) are true, how much more, then, are the selection and presentation of historical information subordinated to Appian's goals? Historical information is provided principally to further Appian's demonstrations, and although he does in the process create an interesting and distinctive depiction of Rome's rise and the Republic's fall, he is nevertheless writing as an advocate—unsurprisingly, given that advocacy was (or had been) his profession.

We cannot know all of the motives that compelled Appian to his advocacy of Rome, but the lack of detachment in his argumentation almost certainly betrays a personal stake in it. We can readily identify conflicts in Appian's *Sitz im Leben* that might have prompted him to write his history. He is among the earliest examples of men of procuratorial rank who had not reached it through the regular military *cursus*.⁸² His equestrian rank proves that he had plenty of money. His correspondence with Fronto and the latter's intercession before Antoninus Pius on Appian's behalf (*ad Pium* 10.3) shows that he moved amicably in very high social circles in Rome.⁸³ Politically, socially, and economically he was a great success, and this must never be forgotten. Perhaps

⁸²See Pflaum 205, Luce 1958: 6. Pflaum notes the fact that the civil career leading to procuratorial status had only been opened up by Hadrian through the institution of the office of *advocatus fisci*. Appian certainly did not hold the latter office, for the reason best stated by Arthur Stein: that office regularly led to a procuratorship, and had Appian held it, there would have been no reason for Fronto to write his famous *Empfehlungsschreiben* for him.

⁸³See Champlin 1980: 41–42, 98–100; Gowing 1992: 274–76. Gabba 1993: 112 sees Appian as a "rappresentante delle classi alte."

even more significantly, almost everything he had achieved was somehow tied to the Empire. He had worked in some way as an advocate in the imperial bureaucracy (*Pr.* 15.62), and it was there that he had evidently made his name, some of his money, and (as he might say it) demonstrated his worthiness by his success. His procuratorial rank (and prerequisite equestrian status?) was owed directly to the emperor who, in the ultimate act of validation had deemed Appian worthy of the honor: ἡξιῶσαν (*Pr.* 15.62).⁸⁴ To see how much procuratorial rank meant to Appian, consider the following: we know that Fronto applied to Pius at least twice on Appian's behalf, and for Fronto to importune Pius again after a rebuff implies that Appian must have pushed him into that awkward situation on the strength of their friendship.

Appian's success made him remarkable, and he clearly sensed this, took satisfaction in it, and expected it to impress others, as his claim to have written an autobiography shows (*Pr.* 15.62): no one writes an autobiography intending to encourage criticism, boredom, or derision. This is important, because his feelings of self-worth and validation—robust enough to prompt an autobiography—were intimately connected with the Empire; accordingly, his sense of worth and, no less significantly, his esteem in the eyes of others had to stand or fall with their positive or negative evaluations of the Empire and their willingness to credit the ability and fitness of individual Emperors to confer validation and honor.⁸⁵

That is only half of the story. It is equally evident that Appian was immensely proud of his Alexandrian origins. His sentimental reference to the Lagids as “my kings” (τοῖς ἐμοῖς βασιλεῦσι, *Pr.* 10.39), his insistence in pairing his success in reaching the “highest rank” in Alexandria (significantly still called his πατρίς: ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ἡκῶν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, *Pr.* 15.62) with his success in reaching procuratorial rank in Rome, his conscious refusal to use the *tria nomina* in the *Preface* (Ἀππιανὸς Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, *Pr.* 15.62), and his

⁸⁴So too Pflaum 205: “Il s’agit d’une des rares promotions, où l’empereur ne s’est pas conformé à la forma, mais où il a procédé selon son bon plaisir, donnée qui augmente sensiblement l’intérêt attaché à cette candidature et explique la lutte que Fronto a dû livrer pour son protégé.” This explains Pflaum’s (and Appian’s) insistence on the extraordinary nature of the appointment.

⁸⁵Gowing (1992: 14 and n. 18, with bibliography) sees Appian’s Alexandrian origin as being a handicap in some ways, which would strengthen my case that he sensed the interest and depth of his own achievement. Alonso-Núñez (643–44) already argued that Appian’s status as a “functionary” in some ways guided his conception of history, though his results were necessarily of limited scope because he restricted his analysis to Appian’s treatment of the scheme of world empires in the *Preface* (8.28–12.49).

inability in his history to avoid elevating Alexandrians at the expense of the other eastern peoples of the Empire all demonstrate that he saw his earlier life in Alexandria as an integral part of who he was, not to be sacrificed to his Romanness.⁸⁶

Alexandrians were notoriously proud of their city and its tradition. We need look no further than the *Acta Alexandrinorum* to find evidence of a brisk Alexandrian dislike for the boorish Romans who had overcome their fatherland because of the dumb contingency that Rome had been more powerful militarily when they came into conflict.⁸⁷ The *Acta* are a type of propaganda (often quite violent) circulated in the form of court transcripts depicting the noble demise of Alexandrians who stand up for their country against oppression; these writings are highly anti-Semitic and anti-Roman.⁸⁸ For our purposes we may examine one good example in the case of the gymnasiarch Appian (*POxy.* 33) who insolently defies an interrogating Roman emperor (probably Commodus). When sentenced to death for *lèse majesté*, he requests nothing more than to be permitted to wear the distinctive garb of his Alexandrian office *en route* to execution.⁸⁹ Both the imagined date of the interview and the papyrus' early third century date postdate our Appian and show the continuity of dislike for the

⁸⁶On Appian and Alexandria, see above all Gowing 1992: 10–16; also Gabba 1956: 110 n. 5; Palm 76–77; Hose 265; Magnino 1996: 904. For specialized discussions of evidence of Appian's Alexandrian or provincial point of view in the *Roman History*, see Hahn 1993: 396–97 (with earlier bibliography); Swain 1996: 251–52 (discussed in the conclusion); Bucher (1997: 174–76).

⁸⁷On Appian and the *Acta Alexandrinorum*, see Gowing 1992: 11–14, esp. n. 18, where he raises (unfortunately only in passing) the evidence for anti-Alexandrine sentiment among the Romans. Hahn 1968b offered the first discussion of Appian in the light of the *Acta*.

⁸⁸On the *Acta*, see Musurillo 236–46, who isolates (254–58) several motifs that run through them, especially love of Alexandria, pride of office, Roman injustice, and anti-Roman bitterness. Musurillo (212) and Tcherikover and Fuks (55–60, 99–107) had already seen that the *Acta* are fictional, and Potter (1996: 146) emphasizes the importance of their guise as transcripts (“Even if all who read it realized that the record was edited, the appearance of transcription conferred authority on the account, and the appearance of authority is what counted”). The violence of the propaganda should not be underestimated: “...it is particularly the anti-Roman bitterness—to be found in no other extant literature to such a degree—which has led recent scholars to classify the *Acta* as the most violent of anti-Roman propaganda” (Musurillo 258 n. 2).

⁸⁹On the papyrus see Musurillo 65–70, 205–20.

Romans in its audience, which certainly included Alexandrian élites.⁹⁰ Our Appian, who claims to have risen ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, will have originated in a circle that contained people like his contumacious younger namesake and moved among people who were the intended audience of the *Acta*. The people for whom the *Acta* were intended are unlikely to have been either kind or moderate in their assessment of Appian's move to Rome, his success there, and his identification with the Empire. Whether anyone in Alexandria deigned to notice Appian's "defection" and attack him for it (there is no evidence) is immaterial to Appian's own expectation of disapproval from people whose opinions he cannot but have respected and cherished. For Appian, the prospect of contempt from his fellow Alexandrians must have been a continual source of unease.

If Appian saw himself as a potential target of fellow Alexandrians because of his great success in Rome and his identification with the Empire, we can begin to see why he might write a work designed to show the worthiness of the Romans to rule, especially if that worthiness had the cachet of divine assistance. If Alexandria had fallen to the Romans, well, so had everyone else, and such divinely ordained success was beyond human resistance. Appian could respond to a critical Alexandrian patriot that he had merely chosen to walk with the cart rather than be dragged by it, to use the famous Stoic metaphor. It is interesting to note that Appian, despite his pro-Roman stance, still depicts the success of the Romans in military terms. It was sheer brute endurance, good planning, steadfastness, and refusal to bow to setbacks (not to mention τύχη and ὁ θεός) that set the Romans on top—not cultural nor moral superiority.⁹¹

⁹⁰For another example, see de Ste. Croix 319. Gowing (1992: 11) rightly emphasizes the importance of Augustus' dissolution of the Alexandrian *boule* in fostering anti-Roman sentiment.

⁹¹Appian merits comparison with Aelius Aristides, a pro-Roman who nevertheless saw the Romans as "really only providing security while the Greeks provided culture, which was first in importance" (Sertiz 1268–70). See also vanderLeest 1988: 201–2; Gowing 1992: 277–82. Magnino 1996: 904 discerns another side of the argument for the Empire: the violence and interested motives in the acquisition of Empire (*Weltreich*) are another means of tacitly arguing that the Empire (*Kaiserzeit*) was beneficial (so too, Gabba 1984: 69). Hahn (1993) develops a view of Appian's work as having a unifying programmatic theme (399–400) and sees the importance of his Alexandrian upbringing and provincial origins (396–97), in agreement with the present study. We part ways thereafter. He sees Appian as paying lip service to the monarchy because it kept the peace, which Hahn argues was an important idea in contemporary historical writing. As for the emperors, Hahn notes that Appian states that they are τὰ πάντα βασιλεῖς, then argues (with insufficient evidence and analysis) that the term in Appian is "eindeutig

But his thinking evidently developed further as he worked. His two main arguments, for Roman success and for the Empire, are not really connected very well. He managed to form a synthesis that neatly brought the two together while performing the admirable service of highlighting Alexandria as well. No later than the composition of the *Mithridatic Wars*, he began a process of altering the endpoint of the *Civil Wars*, and hence the *Roman History*, so as to place the climactic final battle leading to monarchy in a separate treatment of the conquest of Egypt, returning to an ethnic focus for an unprecedented four books. The happiness of Appian's restructuring of his history was reaffirmed by the fact that Rome's success in encircling the Mediterranean was brought to fulfillment only with the acquisition of Egypt, a sort of jewel in the crown.⁹²

At the same moment, Antony and Cleopatra not only brought Roman rule to Egypt by virtue of their war with Octavian, but were also, in forcing the simultaneous emergence of Octavian as the sole ruler, agents in the formation of the Empire. Appian thus placed Egypt (that is, Alexandria) at the pivotal point in world history.⁹³ With a stroke he had not only diminished the sting of Roman conquest but had given his beloved Alexandria a leading role.⁹⁴ For these reasons I cannot accept Gowing's recent argument that a remark of Appian's concerning Antony and Cleopatra ("[their] passion brought ruin upon them and upon all Egypt besides," ἐς ἔσχατον...κακοῦ, *BC* 5.1.2) reveals a dark conception of the entry of Egypt into the Empire ("...the "ruin" brought upon

peiorativ" (369–72; 396–400). The end result is a "crudely anti-Roman Appian" (Swain's critique, 1996: 250 n. 40) who gives a negative view of the Roman conquest on the basis of his provincial origins and sympathies. I have suggested a basis for Hahn's view above in n. 62. Sanford (453) perceived that Appian had a polemic purpose in writing the *Roman History* ("to refute the findings of jealous writers opposed to Rome"), though I think she mistakes the source of the threat.

⁹²Strachan-Davidson 5 is provoked by Appian's claim that Egypt was the last step to the "present state of affairs" (τὰ νῦν ὄντα, *BC* 1.5.22) noting that Britain (*et al.*) was also in the Empire by Appian's day. Gabba attributes too much intended but unexpressed knowledge and precision to Appian in his interpretation of this phrase (1956: 110–11 n. 5); Appian the Alexandrian patriot merely ignores the other conquests as of minor importance (*pace* Strachan-Davidson: cf. *Pr.* 5.18, αὐτῆς [*sc.* ἡπεύρου μεγάλης] ἔχουσιν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, οὐδὲν τῆς ἄλλης δεόμενοι).

⁹³Gabba (1967: 10) sees that the displacement of Egyptian material is meant to highlight the history of Egypt ("dare maggior risalto"), but does not explain why.

⁹⁴Hose 170 (following Cuff 1983: 149) proposes a more detailed explanation of Appian's view of Egypt's fundamental role in the emergence of monarchy: the country's wealth permitted Octavian to solve hitherto intractable problems. In the absence of evidence from Appian's text, it must remain a guess.

Egypt is certainly the fact that it came under Roman domination”). “Ruin” is a defensible translation of the Greek, but Gowing is pressing the English word, not the Greek phrase, in his interpretation; the passage reads better as an admission of the great physical destruction and misery the war caused in Egypt. Is it still negative? It seems to me sufficient to observe that Appian thought that the Empire was a great boon to mankind, and yet he spent five books detailing the divinely orchestrated horrors of its birth in the *Civil Wars*. He is thus accustomed to thinking that the transition to a better state may be painful.⁹⁵

One still unresolved problem was potential criticism of the Empire. Taken on its own terms, Appian’s program relies on an underlying assumption: that the Empire is an undeniable good. As I have argued above, this was almost certainly an unquestioned belief of the author because he was personally beholden to the Empire for his own success (and his attribution of its birth to providence betrays the confidence of his stance). I will turn to his possible reaction to contemporary criticism of the Empire in the following section of this paper (at n. 97).

It is a great shame that we do not possess the *Hundred Years’ History* that followed the *Egyptian History*, nor the subsequent *Dacian* and *Arabian Histories*. As we saw above (at n. 41), it seems as though all three works focused upon external conquests in the fashion of the original ethnic books before the *Civil Wars*. In particular, whatever the precise *termini* of the hundred years that were covered, a connected political history of the Empire was not intended: not only would a gap between the end of the *Hundred Years’ History* and the beginning of material covered in the *Dacian History* be understandable, but there is no reason for us to think that Appian began the *Hundred Years’ History* right at the point that he drew the *Egyptian History* to a close. Such a relegation of the post-Egyptian conquests under the emperors to a single book would have served to maintain the artificial notion that Egypt’s conquest was the climax of history, not to mention of the *Roman History*. Possibly the material in the last two books postdated the Egyptian conquest sufficiently that Appian did not think he would be detracting from the luster of the *Egyptian History* by granting them the dignity of a separate treatment.

V. Appian, Some of His Contemporaries, and the Second Sophistic

Appian’s relationship to his contemporaries and society is a very complex topic that still lacks a comprehensive treatment. Here I wish to make a few observations and to try to sketch in Appian’s position in a very general way against his cultural

⁹⁵Gowing 1992: 115 n. 60. Gabba 1970: 3 translates: “la rovina,” and similarly interprets it as “la perdita dell’indipendenza per l’Egitto.”

background.⁹⁶ A good place to begin is with a near-contemporary whose work may well have had a hand in prompting Appian to write.

As we all know, Tacitus, born only about thirty to forty years before Appian, had painted a lurid picture of tyrannical autocrats and the opportunistic flunkies who thrive on their coattails in the *Annales*, a work published probably in the early years of Hadrian, when Appian must have arrived in Rome, just after the terrible Jewish revolt of 115–17.⁹⁷ Seen in this light, the *Civil Wars* might have had a very timely and serious purpose, as a response by another successful provincial to Tacitus' unremitting attack on emperors in the *Annales*. Tacitus, a *parvenu* senator with a convert's zeal, mourned the loss of oligarchic prestige and freedom of speech and action that the monarchy entailed for the class into which he had risen.

Beginning with the kings (1.1: *urbem Romam a principio reges habuere*), and alluding to their expulsion and the formation of the Republic by mentioning Brutus' institution of "*libertas*" and the consulship, the introduction to the *Annales* then passes full circle through various despotic outbreaks to another monarch: Augustus (*nomine principis sub imperium*), an interpretation Syme called "easy and inescapable."⁹⁸ Anyone might be forgiven for taking Tacitus to regard the principate as a return to monarchy after the *libertas* of the Republic, and further to understand such a comparison to be unflattering. If Tacitus never comes out and says he hates monarchy,⁹⁹ he failed to find any good monarchs among the many he was free to criticize, and makes a good case against monarchy by showing the dangerous hypocrisies and caprices of irresponsible monarchs. By the sheer cumulative effect of his repetitive flaying of emperor after emperor, he gives every appearance of being critical of monarchy, and readers such as Appian, without the time (or perhaps inclination) to analyze

⁹⁶Such a treatment forms a part of my ongoing research.

⁹⁷The chronology need not be exact for the point made here to be valid. With Gowing (1992: 16; cf. Brodersen 1993: 352), I take Appian's arrival in Rome to shortly postdate the Jewish revolt; vanderLeest (1988: 28–32) argues for an arrival perhaps fifteen years later, once Appian had the patronage of a prefect friendly with Fronto to facilitate his move to Rome. Tacitus was writing the *Annales* no earlier than the last years of Trajan (Bowersock 1993: 10), or was still writing under Hadrian (Potter 1991: 290, following Syme's dating—the view I follow). In any event, the *Annales* will neither have swelled to great popularity nor will they have disappeared overnight, so that Appian would have been in good time to encounter them under any reconstruction.

⁹⁸Syme 1958: 364.

⁹⁹On Tacitus and monarchy, Mellor 87–91. Cf. Boissier (1903: 177): "en condamnant les empereurs, on discrédite l'empire."

Tacitus' text with the depth an intense academic focus permits, may not have apprehended that Tacitus was chiefly provoked by "the subtle humiliation or brutal subjugation of the senatorial class, despite the illusion of senatorial authority."¹⁰⁰

Appian, with no stake in the "assembly of kings," can rejoice in the imperial system, since to him nothing good was lost with a Republic that would never have allowed him to succeed anyway. "Freedom" in the Republic included the freedom for powerful aristocrats to quarrel, as shown at length in the *staseis* of the *Civil Wars*. Appian takes Tacitus' program and inverts it, discrediting the Republic by presenting evidence of its inability to maintain public order and indeed even to provide for its own continuing operation (not to mention the hypocrisies and caprices of some Republican political leaders). The two authors are a study in conflicting views of the monarchy conditioned upon the bases of their self-respect, Tacitus focusing on individual monarchs to disguise distaste for a system that humiliated or subjugated his own class, Appian focusing on the institution of monarchy to avoid contemplation of individual monarchs who discredited the system. It is no coincidence that Tacitus highlights the "shame" of the servile senate of the principate whereas Appian calls democracy—meaning the Republic—an "attractive name but always a useless thing." If the violence of the dying Republic in and of itself hardly justified the Empire, Appian's lurid presentation of the ghastly atrocities of the late Republic could at least stifle the criticisms of those lamenting its loss (or adopting the stance of doing so). *Cum domino pax ista venit* (Luc. 1.670): Appian would agree, but with a positive interpretation of *dominus*. For Appian, instability was in the fabric of the Republic, with violent *stasis* an eventual, but ultimately inevitable, consequence because of dispersed power and conflicting views backed by access to substantial military force (cf. *BC* 1.66.302). The Empire with its "king in all respects," though it could no doubt be flawed when a tyrant was on the throne, was at least not a recipe for disaster.

¹⁰⁰Syme readily admits (1958: 547) that "at first sight and on the surface [Tacitus] is hostile to the monarchy," which is about the level of penetration I would expect by a reader, such as Appian, who is hostile to Tacitus' portrait. The quotation: Mellor 90. I am in agreement with Mellor (and Syme 1958: 548) that Tacitus had few illusions about the Republic. I would emphasize more strongly than he Tacitus' view of the Republic as an age of senatorial independence; both Tacitus (Mellor 91) and Appian had contempt for "democracy," but that view is perfectly compatible with either monarchist or oligarchic sentiments. It is also true, of course, that one need not love democracy (or the Republic) to use it as a stick with which to beat monarchs or monarchists over the head; and if Tacitus could write that it was in the interest of peace that all power should be concentrated in one man (*Hist.* 1.1), that in itself does not mean that he liked monarchy (any more than I like the necessity of paying taxes).

Appian ought also to be compared to his friend Fronto. Even more successful than Appian, nevertheless he too manifests psychological oddities due to his position between a Cirtan African homeland and his adoptive *patria* of Rome. Champlin, who has examined Fronto's and other Cirtans' attitudes towards Rome and their homeland, found two symptoms of the strain they were under. First, Fronto, like many Africans, exhibited a hypercorrect Latin to counter the drawback of his backwater origin; secondly, as Champlin writes: "the upper classes [of African society] rejected native culture and energetically adopted the attributes of a civilization to which they were relative newcomers.... This rejection of Africa and identification with Rome was remarkably complete." Fronto's case does not parallel Appian's (Alexandria was hardly a backwater), but it does offer an independent example of how the behavior of prominent Roman citizens could be affected by their provincial origins, and how success in, and consequent identification with, Rome led them to alter the nature of their relationship with their homeland so as to find an acceptable *modus vivendi*.¹⁰¹

In his recent work on Greek intellectuals in the Empire, Swain finds no cause to see in Appian a "thoroughgoing identification with Rome," though he rightly recognizes Appian's Alexandrian patriotism. Swain seems inductively to include Appian in the categories he forms from the more careful study of other Greek imperial intellectuals, and in so doing pushes Appian into a pattern formed in support of a non-Romanocentric thesis.¹⁰² While I generally approve of shifting the focus off Rome, there is no cause to press Appian into a mold as a lukewarm Roman, any more than there was to press him into the mold of "a political historian." Appian was very different from the pattern Swain posits, in that he was a true hybrid and shows unmistakable signs of being pulled in two directions strongly. Far from being a lukewarm Roman and demonstrating a "reasonably evident local patriotism," Appian was strongly attached to both Rome and Alexandria. Unlike many intellectuals who played it cool, Appian tried to unify his two identities, or at least reconcile them with one another. That vanity and insecurity seem to have been among the motivating factors only makes Appian more human: he faced the same problem of integration while maintaining a distinctiveness that is particularly acute today, and he managed to succeed with a certain amount of style.

Swain's study makes it interesting to consider where Appian ought to be placed in the spectrum of contemporary (or near-contemporary) grecophone

¹⁰¹Champlin 1980: 5–19, esp. 18–19.

¹⁰²Swain 1996: 253. On his thesis, see, e.g., 414–21.

intellectuals. Since Fronto's is the only ancient reference to him, it is not surprising that Appian is nowhere designated as a sophist, and we have no evidence to think that he ever practiced the epideictic oratorical displays especially associated with the literary life of the second sophistic.¹⁰³ Appian would probably never have designated himself a sophist, since, as Bowie remarks, Appian's forte, law-court oratory, was "usually looked down upon with contempt by sophists." Brunt points out that "sophist," though susceptible to different uses, was usually a denigratory term and he sharply distinguishes individuals one might best term "polymaths" (e.g., Galen and Plutarch) from sophists; indeed, he concludes that philosophy was the "true centre of intellectual activity in the reputed heyday of the sophists." This is interesting in view of Appian's dislike of philosophers (and the absence of anything like philosophical thought in his extant work), shared, at one point in his life, by Dio of Prusa.¹⁰⁴

Appian's divergence from the norms of the second sophistic and retreat from the philosophical study that characterized the intellectual élite can probably be traced both to his own inclinations and the influence of Fronto. Luce perceptively discerned in Appian a thoroughly rhetorical approach to writing history, to be expected in a forensic orator under the influence of the premier forensic orator of the day, and Gowing quite rightly scents a closer connection to Tacitus (and the younger Pliny) than to the norms of the second sophistic.¹⁰⁵ Appian thought enough of Arrian to use his *Anabasis* in the composition of the *synkrisis* of the lives of Alexander and Caesar that closes *BC* 2, but we can trace no further connection than that. Far more interesting is Appian's relationship to Plutarch. Like him, Appian uses his Greek name though he had the right to the *tria nomina*; the *synkrisis* of Alexander and Caesar pairs the same figures that Plutarch had in his *Lives* with their (lost) *synkrisis*; and Appian makes it a point to emphasize his local success in Alexandria (as Plutarch had mentioned his eponymous magistracy in Chaeronea, *Quaest. conv.* 2.10.1, 6.8.1) and his procuratorship (as Plutarch, too may have held a procuratorship). This is not the place to resurrect the old debate over Plutarch as one of Appian's sources, but I note that Appian's familiarity with Arrian and use of him for what amounts to a

¹⁰³See Brunt 25–33; Bowie 1970: 168–69. That Appian constructs speeches for historical settings can be adequately explained by his operating within certain conventions of the historical tradition.

¹⁰⁴Bowie 1970: 170. Brunt 37–46 (on uses of "sophist" see 48–50). On Dio see Brunt 41. As Champlin (1980: 42) points out, Fronto too shared Appian's distaste for philosophy. See also Luce 1958: 13–15.

¹⁰⁵Luce 1958: 15–17; Gowing 1992: 276.

small parergon in the course of his history makes some reading of Plutarch, especially the *Roman Lives*, a virtual certainty in preparation for the composition of the *Roman History*.¹⁰⁶ Thanks to Pelling, there is now a way to discover whether Plutarch was a source for the *Civil Wars*. The two authors have numerous correspondences of thought and idea, especially in the period covered in *BC* 2, which argue that Appian looked at Plutarch, or that they had a common source, or both. Pelling (see n. 23) showed that Plutarch had taken the material from this source (and probably others) and adapted it to suit the unique narrative requirements of each *Life*, sometimes by inventing a false context, eliminating otiose characters, *vel sim*. He made a start at developing criteria for detecting how material was adapted (deformed, if one prefers) for given lives (by comparing it with parallel versions in other lives). By building upon his work, we could compile a series of diagnostic cases in which we would confidently see the hand of Plutarch adapting the material in a new way to serve his narrative needs. With such a body of diagnostic material, we might then repair to Kornemann's list of parallels and seek correspondences in Appian to material arising with certainty from Plutarch's hand. Two or three telling examples, if found, would put the argument beyond question and perform a great service to the study of Appian.¹⁰⁷

Appian's views on Athens are also instructive, since they seem to place him closer to mainstream thought, which was characterized by an antiquarian interest in that city. Appian classes Macedonians and Greeks in a special élite category and makes his own claim to belong to that category clear in the *Preface* and again in the narrative concerning the campaign of Pharsalus in *BC* 2. Distinctly outside the category are other peoples of the Greek east, particularly Asians. Appian has availed himself of the opportunity offered by the Pharsalus narrative to fashion a literarily-embellished cautionary tale warning of the dangers of disorder and cowardliness, with Pompey's Asian allies as the villains. But even if he saw himself as a fellow member of the élite Hellenic club, an Alexandrian

¹⁰⁶The question of a procuratorship (on the basis of the *Suda* and Eusebius) in 119 is open. *Contra*: Ziegler in *RE* 21 (1951) 657–58, Russell in *OCD*³ (1996) 1200–1201; *pro*: Bowersock 1969: 57 n. 6, 112. Gabba (1956: 227–28) already saw Plutarch as a motivating factor for Appian's *synkrisis*. Barbu (100) found no evidence for direct use but allowed for a general knowledge of Plutarch's relevant *Lives*. Hahn (1968b: 77) argues that Appian used Plutarch's *Antony* directly: *Ant.* 24.6 = *BC* 5.136.566; *Ant.* 25.1, 28.1 = *BC* 5.8.33. His evidence is not very strong, however.

¹⁰⁷Gowing (1992: 46) rightly points out the difficulties that such research will entail but does not seem to see the importance of Pelling's (1979, 1980) discoveries in attacking the problem. Kornemann's list, 1896: 672–91.

might well be a little uneasy about Athens and her age-old claims to cultural primacy. In this respect Athens' treatment in the Pharsalus narrative demands a second look. Having fought on Pompey's side for vain reasons, the Athenians petition Caesar for forgiveness and receive it, but with the utterly humiliating remark (unparalleled in other accounts: *BC* 2.88.368): "ποσάκις ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπολλυμένους ἢ δόξα τῶν προγόνων περισώσει;" The remark admits that the glories of ancient Athens were such as to merit forgiveness for her present-day inhabitants, but also makes the city's current worth cruelly clear. Appian does not include everything in his history, and his choice to include this remark, if he did not invent it himself, is telling: it reads very much like an Alexandrian's disparagement of a city with a rival claim to greatness. We might also note that Appian's attack on philosophers (*Mith.* 28.111) is set in Athens under the Sullan siege. An attack on philosophy while the reader is focused upon the home of Socrates, Plato and so many other great philosophers cannot be entirely contingent upon the events themselves.¹⁰⁸

VI. Conclusion

Appian surely contented himself with the thought that he had not succeeded so impressively in the service of a great evil. The point is not his monarchism, which should not surprise us, but his personal identification with the monarchy as the source of his success. Just as surely, he prided himself on his high origins in the chief cultural center of the Empire.

In the *Roman History*, Appian made a case, perhaps in response to prejudicial judgments that undercut the basis of his self-respect, in order to make his own position less assailable and to find happy middle ground between his conflicting identities as a Roman and an Alexandrian. To be sure, he probably had more reasons for writing than those I have proposed here, even if they are no longer apparent: we should expect complexity and not be surprised to find contradictions in any accurate picture of a real human being. Likewise, it would also be a mistake to think that Appian had no interest in history except as a vehicle for his program, as the *synkrisis* of the lives of Alexander and Caesar at the close of *BC* 2, which serves no apparent programmatic purpose, immediately shows. But even conceding this, much more satisfactory explanations can now be found for Appian's programmatic remarks, for the odd arrangement of his history, his changes in plan, his puzzling omission of some historical material, and the deceptive appearance of his work (which has repeatedly lured the unwary into analyzing it as though it were nothing but a straightforward and disappointingly slipshod political history), once we notice the tensions inherent

¹⁰⁸Pharsalus: Bucher 1997: 136–203; Athens: Bowie 1970: 195–97.

in his social position and his conflicting loyalties. We can also better understand his references to divine aid in connection to the spread of Roman government and its transition to monarchy (not to mention his apparent disdain for “democracy”). If we rightly drop the idea that Appian transplanted or grafted grown stalks and stems from their original context into his own garden, we must then accept that everything in the history was included—and much left out of the history deliberately omitted—by a man who was operating from complex motives that did not necessarily overlap with our needs and expectations as modern consulting historians. Far from being an inept historian compiling excerpts of others’ works as an amusement in his old age,¹⁰⁹ Appian stands out as one of the most interesting characters of his day. He was actively engaged in the ongoing debate about monarchy and the other issues that interested him and had the confidence to reject many of the fashions of his day; but he manifests a very human vanity and insecurity in the face of challenges to the bases of his self-respect, which not only prompted him to compose his history but also marked every part of it. His quirks throw valuable light on the fate of hybrid intellectuals in the high Empire.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹Schwartz 1896: 216: “er verfaßte in der Muße des Alters eine römische Geschichte.”

¹¹⁰Forte (355–60), who notes the rarity of an Alexandrian favorable to Rome and his simultaneous status as proud Roman and Alexandrian, even goes so far as to call Appian a “citizen of the world.”

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